Everywhere Insiders 62: Russia, Africa, Ebola, Gaza and Global Security in 2026

Irina Tsukerman is a New York-registered human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and journalist. She earned a B.A. in International/Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006 and a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She is president of Scarab Rising, Inc., editor-in-chief of The Washington Outsider, and fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and the Arabian Peninsula Institute. Her work focuses on foreign policy, information warfare, security, and Middle Eastern affairs. She serves as Written Content Vice Chair of the American Bar Association’s Science and Technology Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman discuss major geopolitical and humanitarian developments shaping 2026. Their conversation examines the Russia-Japan territorial dispute, Moscow’s alignment with China, the Ebola outbreak in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, humanitarian collapse in Somalia, and the Sudan conflict. They also assess Gaza security, Hamas disarmament, Israeli withdrawal, Hezbollah, settler violence in the West Bank, and the limits of international mediation amid rapidly shifting global power relationships and regional security pressures.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Welcome back to Everywhere Insiders with Irina Tsukerman, The Washington Outsider. I’m Scott Jacobsen. Today, our sources are primarily or exclusively from Reuters.

We have some very interesting news from around the world. This time, we’re going to start with Japan. North Korea has been ramping up its criticism of Japan. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has also been involved in a growing dispute with Russian officials, including Dmitry Medvedev, over the contested islands north of Japan. We’ve been seeing increased Russian pressure surrounding territorial claims. Ukrainians are well aware of Crimea and the Donbas. Looking at recent history within a single generation, geopolitically speaking, you can also look to Chechnya and Georgia. Countries in the region, and therefore the cultures and peoples in the region, are acutely aware of Russia’s history of military intervention and territorial expansion.

The Japanese case regarding these islands is also indicative. You’re well aware of this. It’s been all over the news. What are your thoughts about the response from the Japanese prime minister? What are your thoughts about Medvedev and other Russian officials, and this historical territorial dispute? How does this fit into the longer pattern of territorial claims?

Irina Tsukerman: The fundamental issue with the disputed islands is that Soviet forces occupied them at the end of World War II. Japan refers to the four disputed islands as the Northern Territories, while Russia administers them as part of the Kuril Islands. Japan has continued to claim sovereignty over Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomai islets, and the unresolved dispute has prevented Japan and Russia from concluding a formal postwar peace treaty.

At the time, Japan was in no position militarily to reverse the Soviet occupation. Following its defeat in World War II, Japan’s imperial armed forces were dismantled. Under the 1947 Constitution, Japan renounced war and the use of force to settle international disputes. The Japan Self-Defense Forces were subsequently established in 1954, while Japan’s security relationship with the United States became central to its postwar defense posture.

That was one issue. A second issue was the broader postwar settlement. The Soviet Union had fought alongside the other Allied powers against Nazi Germany and entered the war against Japan in August 1945. At the same time, the Soviet Union imposed its own sphere of influence across much of Eastern Europe after the war. So the geopolitical positioning that emerged was complicated and, in retrospect, highly contentious.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, and after enough time had passed that Japan was no longer regarded as the military threat it had been before 1945, the unresolved territorial dispute increasingly became an obstacle in Japanese-Russian relations. Russia, meanwhile, became increasingly associated with military interventions and unresolved conflicts across the former Soviet space.

The history here requires some distinctions. Russia fought two brutal wars in Chechnya, which is internationally recognized as part of the Russian Federation, so those conflicts were not occupations of another sovereign country. In the South Caucasus, Armenia and Azerbaijan fought over Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding Azerbaijani territories during the 1990s. Russia played a complex and sometimes contradictory role in that conflict rather than simply backing one side throughout it.

There are clearer examples elsewhere. Russia fought a war with Georgia in 2008 and subsequently recognized the Georgian breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent states while maintaining military forces there. The European Union continues to regard those regions as occupied parts of Georgia. Russia has also maintained troops in Moldova’s breakaway Transnistrian region despite Moldova’s objections and international efforts to resolve the conflict.

Those cases contributed to a broader perception of Russia pursuing regional dominance and maintaining leverage through military presence and unresolved territorial conflicts.

I think it was therefore only a matter of time before Japan would increasingly question Russia’s continued control of the disputed islands, both because of the historical sovereignty dispute and because of their strategic significance in Northeast Asia.

The idea that the postwar settlement would permanently discourage territorial aggression also clearly did not resolve the underlying problem. Japan evolved into a constitutional democracy whose military posture was formally centered on self-defense, whereas the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation continued to use military force in a number of regional conflicts.

Both ideologically and strategically, leaving the dispute over the Northern Territories unresolved created a long-term problem. Japan and the Soviet Union restored diplomatic relations in 1956, but they never concluded a formal World War II peace treaty. The territorial question remained unresolved and continues to obstruct a final settlement between Japan and Russia.

Japan’s postwar reconstruction eventually should have been accompanied by a process aimed at reaching some form of territorial settlement. What we are witnessing now is less about ideology and more about the fact that the dispute has become a strategic problem for everyone involved, not only Japan.

The question, then, is why Putin visited the Kuril Islands now. What message was he trying to send? What happened that made his appearance significant?

Several things have happened. First, Japan has become much more active in strengthening its defence capabilities. Its 2026 defence white paper highlighted China’s increased military activity around Taiwan and the changing military balance in the region. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has also said that a Chinese attack on Taiwan could, depending on the circumstances, constitute an existential threat to Japan and potentially permit a military response under Japan’s security legislation.

Japan and Taiwan also have a long historical relationship. Taiwan was under Japanese colonial rule from 1895 until 1945. That history is complicated and should not be reduced to a simple question of Chinese or Japanese ownership. Today, Japan also has significant strategic reasons for closely monitoring Taiwan because any conflict there could directly affect Japanese security and nearby territory.

China has strongly objected to suggestions that Japan could become militarily involved in a Taiwan contingency. Russia has likewise treated Japan’s extensive support for Ukraine and its sanctions against Moscow as hostile policies. These developments have contributed to growing tensions.

Beijing formally protested Japan’s 2026 defence white paper, accusing Tokyo of exaggerating the threat posed by China and making inappropriate statements regarding Taiwan. Japan, for its part, has defended its military buildup as necessary in response to the regional security environment.

Russia has meanwhile become increasingly dependent on economic and strategic ties with China. Chinese companies and supply networks have been accused by Western governments and Ukraine of supplying Russia with dual-use components that can be incorporated into military equipment. Beijing denies supplying lethal weapons to Russia and says it controls exports of dual-use goods. China has also provided Russia with significant diplomatic and economic support while continuing discussions over major energy projects.

Against that background, Putin’s visit to Iturup, known in Japan as Etorofu, can reasonably be interpreted as a political signal. It demonstrated Russia’s determination to assert sovereignty over the disputed islands while reinforcing Moscow’s increasingly close strategic alignment with Beijing.

That broader alignment also involves North Korea and, in a different way, Iran. North Korea has substantially expanded its military cooperation with Russia. Ukrainian and South Korean assessments indicate that approximately 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean troops had previously been sent to Russia, and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has since said Russia is preparing to receive tens of thousands more. North Korea has also supplied Russia with artillery ammunition, ballistic missiles and other military equipment.

China has not publicly opposed the growing relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang. At the same time, a more independent North Korea presents its own complications for Beijing because China has historically sought to retain significant influence over Pyongyang.

So Putin’s visit also serves Russia’s broader strategic relationship with China. Russia itself has little obvious interest in opening another confrontation with Japan while it remains heavily committed to the war against Ukraine. Ukrainian attacks have inflicted substantial damage on Russian refineries and energy infrastructure, reducing refining capacity and disrupting fuel supplies and exports.

Russia has also reduced part of its military presence in Syria. It withdrew forces from Qamishli airport in northeastern Syria earlier this year. However, that should not be described as a complete Russian withdrawal from Syria. Russia has continued to maintain its much larger Hmeimim air base and its naval facility on the Mediterranean coast.

Russia’s reduced military footprint in Syria also raises questions about its broader role in the Middle East. Syria was historically a central element of Soviet strategy in the region, and later became one of Russia’s most important footholds there. So Russia has absorbed several strategic setbacks in relatively quick succession.

This confrontation with Japan may also reflect pressure from China and Beijing’s desire to see more tangible support from Moscow, rather than simply being viewed as the country enabling Russia’s war in Ukraine while some Chinese companies face U.S. sanctions over alleged support for Russia’s military-industrial base. That interpretation remains an inference, but Putin’s visit occurred amid increasingly visible Russian-Chinese coordination against Japan. On August 13, the Russian and Chinese ambassadors in Tokyo issued a joint statement opposing attempts to revise the outcome of World War II and warning against what they described as remilitarisation in the Asia-Pacific.

There is another development that fits into this wider regional picture: Taiwan’s annual Han Kuang war games. Taiwan has been conducting exercises designed to simulate defence against a potential Chinese attack, including scenarios intended to test military readiness under wartime conditions. At roughly the same time, Chinese and Indonesian naval vessels conducted exercises east of Taiwan. Indonesia described them as routine passing exercises rather than preparations for war, while Taiwan condemned the activity as a military provocation.

Taken together, these developments have created an environment of deterrence, strategic communication and increasingly explicit military signalling. Japan is moving toward closer defence relationships with the United States, Australia and other regional partners. Australia and Japan, for example, have significantly expanded their bilateral defence relationship, including a major agreement under which Japan will supply Australia with Mogami-class frigates. Both countries also maintain close security relationships with the United States. It is more accurate, however, to describe this as a network of overlapping bilateral and multilateral defence partnerships than as a formal Australia-Japan-U.S. trilateral defence-trade alliance.

Russia, on the other hand, is demonstrating its increasingly close strategic alignment with China and treating Japan less as a relatively neutral Asian state and more as part of the U.S.-aligned security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Reuters has reported increasingly frequent Chinese military activity near Japan, sometimes alongside Russian warships.

There have also been recurring concerns in Japan about Russian intelligence activity. The original reference to a New York Times report describing a large influx of Russian spies and the expulsion of a specific Russian economic operative could not be independently verified from the sources I reviewed, so I would not state that claim as established fact without the underlying article. More broadly, Russian intelligence activity abroad and diplomatic expulsions over espionage allegations have been extensively documented, but that does not by itself substantiate this particular Japanese case.

In light of these developments, Putin’s visit makes strategic sense as an act of signalling, even if one strongly objects to the underlying policy. It fits into a broader realignment in which Russia has moved closer to China while relations between Moscow and Japan have deteriorated sharply since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Japan joined Western countries in imposing sanctions on Russia, and Moscow subsequently suspended peace-treaty negotiations with Tokyo.

It is also not surprising that Japan is emphasizing its longstanding claim to the four disputed islands more forcefully. Japan has not simply or silently accepted Russian sovereignty over them. Tokyo has consistently maintained that Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and the Habomai islets are Japanese territory, while Russia administers them and regards them as Russian territory. The dispute has prevented the two countries from concluding a formal peace treaty after World War II.

The present strategic environment gives that longstanding dispute additional significance. Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and its continued military presence in disputed or separatist territories elsewhere have heightened Japanese concerns about territorial security. China’s growing military pressure around Taiwan and its increased activity near Japan add another dimension. It is therefore understandable that Tokyo would view Russian control of the disputed islands not only as an unresolved historical question but also as a contemporary strategic concern.

Next, we move to Africa. There has been a great deal happening there this week.

Jacobsen: All right, Chad. President Mahamat Idriss Déby pardoned opposition leader Succes Masra, who had been imprisoned for more than a year after being convicted on charges including inciting violence and complicity in murder. The pardon presents one side of the accountability picture. There are also separate concerns about the treatment of officials and investigators involved in anti-corruption work. Reuters confirms that Masra was pardoned on August 14, although the specific allegation in the original transcript concerning assaults on anti-corruption inspectors investigating the state oil company should be retained only if the corresponding source is available.

In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, public-health pressures remain severe, including concern about infectious-disease outbreaks and the capacity of an already strained health system to contain them. The question is whether the Democratic Republic of the Congo can manage the institutional, logistical and public-health pressures associated with a serious outbreak before it spreads further.

In Somalia, severe child malnutrition is rising as humanitarian funding collapses. Médecins Sans Frontières reported that funding for acute-malnutrition programmes in parts of Somalia had fallen by more than 80 percent in 2026. In displacement camps around Baidoa, one in four children screened was severely malnourished. The United States, previously the largest donor to these programmes, reduced its funding from about $70 million in 2025 to none in 2026, while other Western donors also made cuts. Failed rains, conflict and displacement have compounded the crisis.

In terms of humanitarian assistance, reductions or complete funding cuts are having serious effects in these areas, particularly when combined with drought, displacement and conflict. These conditions also reduce the capacity of governments and humanitarian organizations to respond effectively.

In Sudan, we are looking at humanitarian exhaustion and a war that has effectively become part of everyday life after more than three years of fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, or RSF. The conflict began in April 2023 during the breakdown of Sudan’s attempted transition toward civilian government. It has since produced what the United Nations describes as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. Recent fighting has included renewed RSF attacks around al-Obeid and other areas, while the army controls much of the country’s east and the RSF retains substantial territory in Darfur.

So we are looking at state fragmentation amid a protracted civil war. There are numerous developments coming out of Africa this week. What are your thoughts on these humanitarian crises, disease outbreaks, wars and the resulting fractures in civil society?

Tsukerman: Chad, unfortunately, illustrates some of the governance and institutional problems found in parts of the continent, although it would be too broad to characterize these problems as representative of Africa as a whole. Corruption and weak institutions remain serious problems in Chad.

Unlike many longstanding African leaders, Chad’s President Mahamat Idriss Déby is relatively young. He assumed power after his father, Idriss Déby, was killed in 2021 and was subsequently elected president in 2024 following a military-led transition. His emergence initially raised the possibility that a younger generation of leadership might approach some entrenched political problems differently. What we are seeing, however, is that institutional reform is considerably more difficult than changing the individual at the top.

Once you become part of an established political system, there can be powerful incentives to accommodate existing institutions and interests rather than confront everyone who benefits from corruption or entrenched patronage.

The pardon of opposition leader Succes Masra is a positive development in the narrow sense that he has been released from a lengthy imprisonment. But the broader circumstances remain concerning. Masra, Déby’s principal political rival, had been imprisoned for more than a year after being convicted on charges including inciting violence and complicity in murder. Déby pardoned him on August 14.

That raises a broader question about whether opposition candidates can participate freely and safely in political systems where political competition may expose them to prosecution, imprisonment or other forms of pressure. Without strong institutional protections for political opposition and credible electoral competition, capable reformers and anti-corruption figures may have little incentive to seek higher office. At the local level, political competition may sometimes be more viable, but entrenched national power structures can be considerably harder to challenge.

The second issue concerns the reported treatment of anti-corruption investigators. I do not know from the available evidence whether the alleged attacks on these investigators originated at the highest levels of government, involved other political or institutional factions, or reflected a state that has less control over its institutions than it appears to have. That distinction matters, and I would not attribute responsibility without stronger evidence.

Neither scenario is particularly reassuring. The international community should support the development of transparent and accountable political institutions that protect legitimate anti-corruption investigations and create meaningful incentives to combat corruption.

In Chad, as in other states with weak institutions and entrenched patronage networks, politics can provide opportunities for political and economic elites to enrich themselves, their associates and their families. When that occurs, it can create a cycle of corruption, weakened institutions and declining public trust.

This creates a closed cycle of greed, embezzlement, weakened institutions and declining confidence among younger entrepreneurs, youth activists, women and others who are excluded from entrenched political and patronage networks.

Until we see clearer and more structured resistance to the monopolization of political power, many countries with weak institutions will continue to fall short of their economic and social potential. It would be too broad, however, to characterize Africa as a whole in those terms. Political conditions vary enormously across the continent.

Moving on to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the situation is particularly severe because public-health pressures are interacting with armed conflict, displacement, weak institutions and foreign involvement in eastern Congo. Those overlapping pressures have made disease surveillance and treatment considerably more difficult.

The current Ebola outbreak is not simply the result of poor hygiene or ignored burial practices. The outbreak appears to have originated through a new animal-to-human transmission of Bundibugyo virus. What has made it spread so rapidly is a combination of delayed detection, conflict, strained health services, gaps in surveillance and substantial population movement. By August 14, confirmed infections had reached 4,665, including 2,184 deaths, and the disease had spread into a sixth province.

So you now have a health system under extraordinary pressure. There is also an important scientific limitation in this outbreak: the Bundibugyo species of Ebola responsible for it currently has no approved vaccine or specific treatment. Experimental vaccines and therapeutics are being tested, but they should not be described as established vaccines that merely need to be distributed. WHO has said that clinical development is advancing, and several vaccine candidates are being prepared for trials.

Funding has also been a serious concern. Earlier in the outbreak, WHO reported receiving less than half of the money it estimated was required for the response. The United States subsequently increased its commitment substantially, including an additional $242 million announced in August, bringing total U.S. support to approximately $512 million. So it would no longer be accurate to say that a collapse in U.S. funding is presently causing the outbreak to spread.

Ebola is also very different epidemiologically from COVID-19. It does not spread efficiently through ordinary airborne transmission. Infection usually requires direct contact with the blood or other bodily fluids of an infected person, contaminated materials, or infected animals. That makes international transmission less likely than with a respiratory virus, although the severity of Ebola means that even isolated imported cases require an intensive public-health response.

The United States has therefore imposed unusually strict travel measures. CDC guidance currently provides that travelers who have been in the Democratic Republic of the Congo during the preceding 21 days, including U.S. citizens and nationals, may not board commercial flights bound for the United States. The CDC has also introduced enhanced screening and monitoring procedures for travelers connected to affected countries.

Upon my return from Italy, I encountered public-health screening related to the outbreak. I cannot say from that experience alone that travelers from Spain, Italy or other European countries were being tested specifically because Ebola had already spread there. The evidence available publicly does not establish sustained Ebola transmission in those European countries. The broader concern is that infected travelers could move internationally before symptoms are recognized, which is why surveillance and screening measures have been strengthened.

The risk of an infected traveler reaching the United States is considered low, but not zero. U.S. infectious-disease specialists have said that the country is much better prepared than it was during the 2014 West African outbreak, including through a network of specialized treatment centers capable of isolating and treating suspected Ebola cases.

The current U.S. approach has also included plans to manage exposed Americans outside the United States under certain circumstances. Reuters reported earlier in the outbreak that exposed but asymptomatic U.S. citizens could be quarantined abroad rather than immediately repatriated, an approach that generated controversy. That is different from saying that the United States has simply established clinics abroad exclusively for Americans while providing no assistance to local communities. The United States is simultaneously providing hundreds of millions of dollars to the wider Ebola response in Congo and neighboring countries.

There still is no simple solution. The immediate priorities remain rapid detection, isolation of cases, contact tracing, safe clinical care, protection of health workers, community engagement and continued research into vaccines and treatments specifically effective against Bundibugyo virus.

That becomes another matter. Hopefully, there will be substantial international support for public-health education, surveillance and the development of vaccines and treatments appropriate to the specific Ebola strain involved. For now, it remains a major problem.

Moving on to Somalia, the humanitarian crisis is severe and has deep structural causes. Somalia continues to struggle with prolonged conflict, weak state institutions, displacement, drought and recurring food insecurity. I would add that the collapse in humanitarian funding is not simply a question of U.S. assistance. Somalia has long depended on a broad range of international donors and humanitarian organizations.

The United States had been an especially important donor, however. In 2025, it provided about $70 million to aid agencies working on nutrition in Somalia, according to Médecins Sans Frontières. That funding fell to zero in 2026, while other Western donors also reduced their support. Funding available for Somalia’s humanitarian response has fallen dramatically, from approximately $2.2 billion during the comparable drought emergency in 2022 to roughly $300 million in 2026.

Turkey has also been a significant political, economic, development and humanitarian partner of Somalia for many years. I would not say, however, that Turkey has been “by far” the larger humanitarian donor than the United States without comparable current figures. Nor is there sufficient evidence here to say that Turkey is giving up on Somalia. Turkey itself has faced persistent high inflation and economic pressures, although describing its current condition as hyperinflation would be inaccurate.

The larger point is that humanitarian funding by itself cannot resolve Somalia’s political and institutional problems. Medical assistance, nutrition programmes and emergency relief can save lives, but durable improvements require stronger public institutions, greater security, functioning health systems and greater governmental capacity. It would be too categorical to describe investment in Somali institutions as simply “throwing money into a black hole.” Somalia has functioning national and regional institutions, even though their reach and effectiveness remain severely constrained in parts of the country.

Who would lead a deeper institutional transition, and with what resources, is a separate question. But without sustained political reform and greater accountability, humanitarian organizations will continue to operate in an exceptionally difficult environment. Repeated drought, armed conflict and displacement make those problems considerably worse. More than half a million people were displaced in Somalia during the first three months of 2026, while approximately 6.5 million were facing acute hunger earlier in the year.

Similarly, in Sudan we are dealing with deeply entrenched institutional and military problems. The war is not best described simply as a sectarian conflict between two authoritarian leaders. It began as a power struggle between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces over control of the state and the planned integration of their forces during Sudan’s failed political transition. Since then, regional, ethnic and communal dimensions have become increasingly important, particularly in Darfur and other contested areas. Foreign powers and transnational commercial networks have also become entangled in the conflict.

The RSF is currently under substantial military pressure, but it would be premature to say there is no conceivable path for it to expand its control. It still controls much of Darfur, has established a parallel governmental structure there and continues offensive operations elsewhere, including in Kordofan and Blue Nile state. At the same time, the Sudanese army has made significant gains and controls much of the eastern half of the country, including Khartoum after retaking the capital in 2025.

At this stage, the RSF appears focused both on preserving its territorial base and on expanding strategically where opportunities arise. Control over economic resources is an important part of the war. Gold is particularly significant. Britain imposed sanctions in July 2026 on individuals and networks it said were involved in illicit gold and financial operations helping to sustain the conflict. Sudan’s gold trade has long been intertwined with regional commercial networks, especially those connecting Sudan with the Gulf.

Strategic infrastructure also matters. The RSF has taken control of the Heglig oilfield, an important facility for processing South Sudanese oil, while Port Sudan remains crucial to Sudan’s access to the Red Sea and international trade. Russia has separately pursued a longstanding agreement for a naval facility on Sudan’s Red Sea coast, although such a base has not yet been established. These competing economic and strategic interests help explain why Sudan attracts sustained external attention, but they should not be reduced solely to a struggle over gold mines and ports.

For the local belligerents, political survival, military power and avoidance of accountability are also powerful incentives. When armed actors believe that defeat could mean imprisonment, loss of power or even death, compromise becomes much harder. That contributes to a conflict in which the welfare of civilians is repeatedly subordinated to military and political objectives.

I would be cautious, however, about saying that a complete Sudanese army victory would necessarily be the best humanitarian outcome. Consolidating power under the army might end one dimension of the conventional war, but it would not guarantee an end to atrocities, political repression or localized violence. Both sides have been accused of serious abuses during the conflict. A military victory by either side would therefore not, by itself, resolve Sudan’s underlying political crisis.

What can be said is that continued territorial fragmentation and warfare have imposed an enormous cost on civilians. Any durable settlement would need not only to stop the fighting but also to address political governance, accountability, humanitarian access and the role of armed forces within the Sudanese state.

A reduction in the number of active belligerents could, in one narrow sense, make international pressure easier to concentrate, because outside actors would be dealing with fewer competing military authorities. But that would not necessarily resolve Sudan’s political or humanitarian crisis.

A decisive military outcome is also unlikely to come quickly. The Sudanese Armed Forces have made significant gains, but the RSF continues to control substantial territory and retains important external relationships. The conflict has drawn in regional powers, with different states supporting or maintaining ties with the opposing sides. Reuters has documented, for example, Egyptian support for the Sudanese army and reported on an alleged training operation in Ethiopia for RSF fighters.

This is where outside powers should be applying sustained pressure on both sides toward a negotiated settlement and some form of locally grounded reconciliation process. But there are entrenched external interests, and many of the governments involved have their own security, political and economic objectives. Those interests can make coordinated diplomacy considerably more difficult. External backing has been a concern throughout the war because it risks prolonging the conflict rather than resolving it.

That is one reason Sudan remains where it is today.

Jacobsen: Was there anyone else there, or is that it? We could move to Iran, the Palestinian territories, Israel and Lebanon. It is a complicated situation, with several different stories. We can concentrate on the Middle East this time.

There are numerous developments. First, Iran is trying to preserve bargaining power despite substantial military and economic pressure. The Strait of Hormuz has become one of its principal instruments of leverage. I would not call it Iran’s sole bargaining instrument, because Tehran retains other military, diplomatic and regional tools, but control over access to the strait has become central to the current negotiations.

Iran has insisted that restrictions on shipping through Hormuz will remain until the United States meets its conditions, including sanctions-related demands. Reuters has reported that the waterway, which normally carries a major share of global oil and gas shipments, has become a central point of leverage in stalled U.S.-Iran negotiations.

Israel, meanwhile, is pursuing a highly security-focused approach while confronting significant political and diplomatic constraints in Gaza, southern Lebanon and the West Bank.

In Lebanon, Israel has explicitly tied its withdrawal from southern Lebanese territory to the verified disarmament of Hezbollah. Hezbollah has rejected full disarmament while Israeli forces remain in Lebanon, creating a continuing impasse. The United States has argued that Israeli withdrawal should proceed within an agreed framework linked to Hezbollah’s disarmament and the deployment of the Lebanese Armed Forces.

In Gaza, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has likewise rejected Israeli withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed. The current U.S.-backed roadmap links phased Israeli withdrawal to the disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups, rather than treating withdrawal and disarmament as completely separate processes.

There is also growing criticism of Israeli settler activity in the occupied West Bank. In one recent case in Qusra, settlers were accused of surrounding Palestinian homes, cutting water and electricity and blocking access. U.S. Ambassador Mike Huckabee strongly condemned the attackers, while Washington pressed Netanyahu to respond publicly.

The Gaza Board of Peace also remains active, and discussions with Israel are continuing. After Netanyahu rejected withdrawal until Hamas is genuinely disarmed, a Board of Peace official said that the plan remained operative and was continuing to advance.

The official said that implementation would depend on verification on the ground, with each stage moving forward only after the required commitments had been met. The broader roadmap links Hamas’s disarmament to staged Israeli withdrawals and a new administrative and security framework for Gaza.

Israel is therefore not simply being asked to rely on trust or to undertake every withdrawal before the corresponding security conditions are verified.

That statement from the Board of Peace is not unreasonable. At the same time, it remains a highly diplomatic formulation. It explains the principle behind the process more clearly than it explains how the most difficult parts will actually be implemented.

The central problem remains enforcement. The Board of Peace can describe a sequence of commitments, verification and reciprocal steps, but the difficult question is how Hamas’s disarmament, Israeli withdrawal and the creation of a functioning postwar security arrangement will be achieved in practice. Trump said in July that the Board had reached an agreement concerning the disarmament of Hamas and other armed groups, but subsequent disagreements with Netanyahu show that important elements of implementation remain unresolved.

Jacobsen: If you are acting as an intermediary, the public needs more than a restatement of positions. Netanyahu has been clear that there must be genuine Hamas disarmament before Israel completes its withdrawal. Other parties reject that sequencing, and that is one of the central disagreements. The Board of Peace, as an intermediary, has explained the framework but has not yet resolved that underlying dispute. Reuters reports that its roadmap instead links phased Israeli withdrawal to verified disarmament, while Netanyahu is insisting that disarmament come first.

There are also serious developments on the ground. Israeli settlers in the occupied West Bank have been accused of surrounding Palestinian homes and cutting water and electricity supplies, prompting strong U.S. criticism. In Gaza, cancer patients are facing severe restrictions on access to treatment. Doctors told Reuters that cancer mortality has risen sharply because Gaza’s principal specialized cancer hospital was destroyed, treatment capacity has collapsed, and many patients have been unable to leave the territory for care.

There are numerous other developments involving Syria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Yemen and Oman, but I think we should narrow our focus somewhat.

Tsukerman: I see Lebanon and Gaza as sharing some structural similarities, although their political histories and governing systems are very different. In both cases, international efforts have repeatedly struggled with the problem of powerful armed non-state organizations operating alongside weak or divided governing institutions.

In Lebanon, the government is under intense international pressure to establish a state monopoly over weapons and disarm Hezbollah. The Lebanese Armed Forces have already made significant progress in asserting control south of the Litani River, but extending that process throughout the country remains politically and operationally difficult. Hezbollah has rejected efforts to disarm it, and the Lebanese government has warned that the army has limited capabilities.

It would not be accurate to say that the Lebanese government needs Hezbollah to continue receiving U.S. support or that American assistance would automatically end if Hezbollah were disarmed. The United States has provided substantial assistance to the Lebanese Armed Forces precisely to strengthen state institutions and enable the government to extend its authority. In 2025, Washington approved approximately $190 million for the Lebanese Armed Forces as part of a broader package for Lebanon’s security services.

Nor is there reliable evidence that 30 to 40 percent of the Lebanese Armed Forces are Hezbollah members. Hezbollah has political representation in Lebanon and longstanding influence in parts of the country’s political and security environment, but that numerical claim about the army should not be stated without strong evidence. The United States has sanctioned some individuals in Lebanese institutions whom it accuses of supporting Hezbollah, but that is very different from establishing that such a large proportion of the armed forces belongs to the organization.

The more defensible criticism is that the Lebanese state has historically struggled to monopolize armed force and prevent Hezbollah from conducting military operations independently. Lebanon’s government formally banned Hezbollah military activity after the group fired on Israel in March 2026, and the army has since been implementing disarmament and clearance measures in the south.

Israel’s current position is that it will not complete its withdrawal from southern Lebanon until Hezbollah is verifiably disarmed. The U.S.-brokered June agreement also links progressive Israeli withdrawal to the verified disarmament of non-state armed groups. Hezbollah rejects that sequencing and argues that Israel must withdraw first. That creates a genuine strategic impasse rather than a simple case of either side refusing an otherwise straightforward process.

In Gaza, there are some parallels but also major differences. Hamas has accepted the basic Board of Peace roadmap, including a process for relinquishing weapons, but disagreements remain over the extent and sequencing of disarmament. The plan calls for heavy weapons, military production sites, weapons depots and tunnels to be decommissioned or secured under a new technocratic administration, while an International Stabilization Force and new Palestinian police are supposed to assume security responsibilities.

The original statement that Hamas intends to participate in new national elections should be treated cautiously. Gaza did hold a limited local election in April 2026, the first of its kind there in years, but Hamas officially boycotted that vote even though some candidates were viewed as sympathetic to it. That is not the same thing as evidence that Hamas has committed to participating in a forthcoming general election under the new Gaza framework.

The historical reference to 2006 also needs precision. Hamas won the January 2006 Palestinian legislative election. It subsequently formed a government, but tensions with Fatah escalated into armed conflict. In June 2007, Hamas forcibly took control of Gaza after several days of fighting with Fatah-aligned security forces. There were documented atrocities and summary killings during that conflict, but saying that Hamas began “throwing coalition partners from roofs” immediately after the 2006 election compresses separate events and exaggerates the chronology.

Before Hamas consolidated control, Gaza already contained rival armed factions, competing security services and clan-based power networks. Those divisions contributed to the instability that culminated in the 2007 Hamas takeover. The current concern is therefore not simply whether Hamas formally gives up particular weapons, but whether a new administration can establish a legitimate and effective monopoly on force.

That remains one of the central unresolved questions in the Board of Peace plan.

There is no guarantee that this process will succeed. Gaza currently lacks a broadly accepted governing authority with both legitimacy and the capacity to monopolize force. Any postwar administration would therefore require substantial external backing, security assistance and institutional support.

It would be too broad to say that there is no international backing for Gaza or Lebanon. In Gaza, the U.S.-backed Board of Peace has developed a framework involving a Palestinian technocratic administration, a new Palestinian police force and an International Stabilization Force, or ISF. Several countries have committed personnel, although deployment has been much slower and more limited than originally envisioned. In February, Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo and Albania committed troops, while Egypt and Jordan agreed to help train Palestinian police. By August, however, Reuters reported that only Morocco and Uganda were still pledging troops for the ISF, while Kosovo, Albania and Kazakhstan had committed planners and medical personnel. The force remained months away from full deployment.

So the problem is not that literally no one is coming. The problem is that the international security component remains far short of the scale required for the proposed transition. The long-term concept has envisioned an ISF of roughly 20,000 personnel, but actual commitments and deployment have lagged considerably behind that ambition.

Under those circumstances, Israel’s security concerns about disarmament cannot simply be dismissed as obstructionism. There is still no clearly implemented pathway for removing weapons from Hamas and other armed groups while simultaneously creating an alternative security structure capable of preventing renewed violence. The Board of Peace roadmap attempts to solve that problem through phased disarmament, verified demilitarization, Israeli withdrawal and deployment of international and Palestinian security forces. The dispute concerns the sequencing and guarantees. Israel insists that Hamas must be fully disarmed before withdrawal, while the roadmap links disarmament and withdrawal in stages.

During the Gaza war, there were legitimate political questions about Israeli strategy, including whether Prime Minister Netanyahu’s government was prolonging military operations and whether alternative approaches could have reduced civilian harm or accelerated negotiations. Those questions should be distinguished from the narrower present issue of whether demanding verifiable disarmament as part of a postwar settlement is itself unreasonable.

Hamas has demonstrated a considerable capacity to survive politically and militarily despite severe losses. That survival presents a central problem for any postwar framework if Hamas retains an independent military capability outside the authority of a new Palestinian administration.

The Board of Peace is not relying solely on Hamas’s word. Its proposals call for international verification, weapons decommissioning, a buyback and reintegration programme, and the destruction or neutralization of military infrastructure. A March proposal envisioned an eight-month process in which Hamas would relinquish weapons in stages and Gaza’s military tunnel network would be dismantled, with reconstruction and Israeli withdrawals proceeding alongside verified demilitarization.

The tunnels are therefore not an overlooked issue. They are explicitly part of the demilitarization plans. Hamas built an extensive underground network in Gaza for command, movement, storage and military operations, and tunnels remained operational after the major fighting. Any serious security arrangement would have to address that infrastructure.

Lebanon presents a related but distinct problem. Hezbollah has also constructed military infrastructure, including tunnels and fortified positions, particularly in southern Lebanon. The current U.S.-brokered framework seeks the verified disarmament of Hezbollah and other non-state armed groups while transferring security responsibilities to the Lebanese Armed Forces. Israel has tied its withdrawal from southern Lebanon to that process.

External monitoring is therefore essential. Whichever Palestinian political faction eventually governs Gaza, the central institutional question is whether that authority possesses an effective monopoly over weapons and underground military infrastructure. If Fatah or another Palestinian administration assumed control without dismantling independent armed networks, it could face many of the same structural security problems.

It would also be inaccurate to say simply that Fatah or the Palestinian Authority has “allowed terrorism” from the West Bank to persist. Israel has repeatedly accused the Palestinian Authority of failing to suppress militant groups sufficiently, particularly in areas such as Jenin. The Palestinian Authority, however, has also carried out armed operations against Palestinian militant factions and argues that Israeli military operations and restrictions have weakened its ability to govern effectively.

At the same time, Jared Kushner may travel to Israel next week for talks on Gaza. Reuters reported that he is also expected to meet mediators from Egypt, Qatar and Turkey in Cairo. The purpose of the proposed trip is to find a pathway toward implementing Trump’s Gaza plan amid continuing disagreements over disarmament and Israeli withdrawal.

While those negotiations continue, the situation in the occupied West Bank has also reached a serious point. Israel has struggled to control escalating violence by some settlers against Palestinian civilians. In Qusra, settlers were accused of surrounding Palestinian homes, cutting water and electricity and attempting to prevent residents from entering or leaving. Israeli soldiers subsequently intervened, and U.S. Ambassador Mike Huckabee publicly described the perpetrators as Israeli terrorists.

This is part of a broader increase in settler violence. Reuters has documented attacks on Palestinian villages, homes, agricultural property and religious sites, alongside clashes in which both Israelis and Palestinians have been killed. Israeli authorities have sometimes intervened against settlers, but rights organizations and international investigators have also accused Israeli security forces of failing to prevent attacks or, in some cases, protecting settlers involved in violence.

So the issue is no longer whether settler violence exists. It clearly does. The question is whether Israeli institutions are willing and able to consistently investigate, prosecute and prevent politically motivated violence against Palestinian civilians while also addressing attacks against Israelis.

That is not to say that I approve of what these settlers are doing. I think these acts are dangerous, destructive and completely unacceptable. Anyone responsible for violence, intimidation, arson or other criminal conduct should be investigated and, where the evidence supports it, prosecuted. The same standard should apply to Palestinians who commit politically motivated violence against Israelis.

At the same time, I do not think the broader radicalization process was entirely unpredictable. Years of violence, weak accountability, political incitement and mutual distrust can radicalize people on both sides. That does not excuse settler violence, nor does Palestinian violence make attacks on Palestinian civilians legitimate. It does mean that political and security failures can create conditions in which extremists gain greater influence.

When such incidents were less frequent, there was a stronger opportunity for European, American, Arab and Israeli leaders, as well as Palestinian authorities, to establish a consistent principle that politically motivated violence against civilians would not be tolerated regardless of who committed it. There have, in fact, been repeated international condemnations of both Palestinian attacks and Israeli settler violence. European governments have condemned Palestinian attacks on Israeli civilians while also criticizing settlement expansion and settler violence.

The international response to settler violence has also become stronger. Britain, Canada, France and Norway imposed coordinated sanctions in June 2026 on individuals and networks accused of financing, enabling or carrying out violent attacks by settlers in the occupied West Bank. Israel rejected those measures.

Unfortunately, some politicians associated with the settlement movement and the Israeli far right now hold considerable influence within the government. Israel is scheduled to hold a national election on October 27, 2026, so there is at least the possibility of a political realignment. Whether that election produces meaningful changes in policy, accountability or efforts at deradicalization remains uncertain.

Part of the reason this situation has deteriorated is widespread distrust in the government’s ability to manage security. Netanyahu bears responsibility for decisions made under his governments, but these problems also extend across multiple Israeli and Palestinian administrations. Long-running militant violence, failures of governance within the Palestinian Authority, settlement expansion, incitement and inadequate accountability have all contributed to an increasingly unstable environment.

Now that settler violence has escalated substantially, merely replacing individual officials will not be enough. A broader approach is required. There needs to be a transparent process for countering political extremism, protecting civilians and ensuring that criminal conduct is investigated regardless of the perpetrator’s nationality or political affiliation.

That requires changes on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides. The Palestinian Authority has its own record of institutional weakness, authoritarian practices and failures to suppress some armed groups. At the same time, Israeli governments have an obligation to prevent violence by settlers and enforce the law against Israeli citizens in the occupied West Bank. A United Nations inquiry in June concluded that Israeli authorities had in some cases enabled or failed to prevent settler violence, findings that Israel rejected.

I would also distinguish between governments, political organizations and diaspora communities. It would be too broad to say that Palestinians abroad generally fail to criticize violence committed by Palestinians. Diaspora communities are politically diverse, and there is no reliable basis for making a categorical comparison between how Jewish and Palestinian diasporas respond to violence.

There is, however, an interesting asymmetry in public expectations. Jewish people outside Israel are often asked to express opinions about or condemn the actions of the Israeli government even when they are not Israeli citizens and have no direct political role in Israel. Similar expectations can also be placed on Palestinians abroad, Muslims, Arabs and other diaspora populations when violence occurs in the region. Those expectations can become problematic when ethnic or religious identity is treated as equivalent to political responsibility.

For example, I may have ancestral connections to another country, but that does not necessarily give me political responsibility for what its government does. Nationality, citizenship, family background and cultural heritage are different things. The same distinction should apply consistently to Jewish, Israeli, Palestinian and other diaspora communities.

What can be documented more clearly is the response from Israeli and international institutions to current settler violence. Israeli media and civil-society organizations have reported extensively on attacks by extremist settlers. In the recent Qusra case, U.S. Ambassador Mike Huckabee described the settlers besieging Palestinian homes as “Israeli terrorists,” and the White House pressed Netanyahu to condemn their actions.

Several Western governments have also sanctioned individuals and organizations accused of facilitating settler violence. Britain, Canada, France and Norway coordinated sanctions in June. Those measures demonstrate that there has been meaningful international action, even if one can reasonably debate whether it has been sufficient or effective.

It would therefore be inaccurate to say that European governments have failed to condemn Palestinian violence while responding only to Israeli settler violence. European governments have condemned attacks by Palestinian militants as well. The more defensible criticism is that accountability and diplomatic pressure have often been inconsistent, uneven or insufficient across different episodes of violence.

Jacobsen: There is a lot of news, as there is every week. We do not need to cover everything every week. We can keep our aspirations as two people modest. Thank you very much for your time again. That was Everywhere Insiders.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer and Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 2,000 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic, media, and research institution fellowships, and currently serves on numerous international boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.