Everywhere Insiders 63: Alex Jones, Ceuta Migration and Asia-Pacific Militarization

Irina Tsukerman is a New York-registered human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and journalist. She earned a B.A. in International/Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006 and a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She is president of Scarab Rising, Inc., editor-in-chief of The Washington Outsider, and fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and the Arabian Peninsula Institute. Her work focuses on foreign policy, information warfare, security, and Middle Eastern affairs. She serves as Written Content Vice Chair of the American Bar Association’s Science and Technology Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine three interconnected crises: Alex Jones’s Sandy Hook defamation judgments and conspiratorial politics, Spain’s migration pressures in Ceuta, and growing strategic militarization across Europe and the Asia-Pacific. Tsukerman discusses misinformation, legal accountability, migration policy, China-Russia-North Korea-Iran cooperation, North Korean involvement in Ukraine, Taiwan’s defense buildup, and the wider consequences of increasingly interconnected geopolitical conflicts for democratic states and international security amid shifting global balances of power.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Welcome back to Everywhere Insiders with The Washington Outsider’s Irina Tsukerman, and Scott Jacobsen. Today, we are sourcing primarily from AP News and looking domestically within the United States. We have a series of interesting personalities.

The first concerns Alex Jones and Infowars. The satirical outlet The Onion has sought to acquire Infowars and turn it into a parody operation. The Onion has separately launched a parody of Jones’s conspiracy-oriented content.

Jones was sued over false claims concerning the Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting. A Texas appeals court recently reduced a judgment of more than $50 million against him to roughly $6 million, largely because Texas law caps punitive damages. The compensatory damages awarded to Neil Heslin and Scarlett Lewis remain, while the punitive portion was reduced to $1.5 million.

Sandy Hook was a mass shooting in which 20 children and six educators were killed in 2012. Jones repeatedly portrayed the massacre as a hoax or staged event. Given the size of his platform, those claims had consequences well beyond ordinary political commentary.

Jones also faces a separate judgment exceeding $1 billion in Connecticut. An attorney representing Heslin and Lewis dismissed the significance of the Texas reduction, emphasizing that it affects only two of the claimants and leaves the much larger Connecticut liability intact.

This is a complex case that would require more legal commentary than we have time for today. In the broader context of Jones’s conspiracy-oriented media persona and The Onion’s effort to parody that ecosystem, what are your thoughts on both the personality and the case?

Irina Tsukerman: None of it is particularly surprising. Defamation law in the United States sets a substantial threshold, particularly where speech concerns public issues or public figures, because constitutional law strongly protects freedom of expression.

The fact that Alex Jones nevertheless incurred judgments of this magnitude indicates how serious the courts and juries considered the conduct. His false claims about Sandy Hook went well beyond ordinary political hyperbole. The original juries sought to make clear that knowingly or recklessly spreading falsehoods that inflict serious harm on grieving families can carry legal consequences.

This has little to do with suppressing legitimate free speech. Defamation law does not protect every false factual assertion simply because it is expressed publicly, particularly when the applicable legal elements are satisfied.

There was also a commercial dimension. Jones built and maintained an audience through sensational and often outrageous claims, which helped generate attention and revenue.

There is a comparison to be made with defenses used in other media defamation cases, including litigation involving Tucker Carlson, where attorneys argued that certain statements should be understood as opinion, rhetorical hyperbole, or commentary rather than literal assertions of fact. That argument arose in Carlson’s 2020 defamation case involving Karen McDougal, rather than as his personal defense in Dominion’s later case against Fox. In the Dominion litigation, the Delaware court found that several challenged election-related statements were factual assertions capable of being proven true or false.

In Jones’s case, portraying the murder of children as a hoax was not merely provocative entertainment. It was false, and some members of his audience believed those claims. That distinction matters.

He also did not invent every conspiracy theory he promoted. Many circulated through a broader conspiratorial media ecosystem. Jones amplified, adapted, and popularized claims that sometimes originated elsewhere. His significance was not necessarily authorship, but the enormous reach he gave them.

They were recycled conspiracy theories that had been circulating for years, which he repackaged under his own brand and sold to the public. Some of his audience consisted of people who did not know these were longstanding conspiracy theories that had been documented and debunked. Others were already inclined toward conspiratorial thinking and were looking for someone like him. He fed them this information.

There were also younger, impressionable audiences who simply fell for his bullshit. There is no other way to put it. Alex Jones knew what he was doing. He was deliberate in his strategy of using outrageous and discredited falsehoods to attract attention to himself and his show, gain public support, and position himself as a fringe but controversial figure willing to challenge mainstream narratives.

Ironically, while he went considerably further than many MAGA-aligned figures in his disregard for the truth, he contributed to a conspiratorial political culture with much older roots. Figures such as Lyndon LaRouche had previously exploited paranoia across ideological boundaries, beginning on the far left before developing alliances and audiences elsewhere. Elements of this conspiratorial style have since become increasingly visible in MAGA and MAGA-adjacent circles.

While Alex Jones represented an extreme version of that strategy, others were more cautious or chose different targets. Figures such as Tucker Carlson often employed an “I’m just asking questions” approach, framing controversial claims as questions, opinions, or commentary rather than straightforward factual accusations. Such rhetorical strategies can reduce legal exposure in some circumstances, although they do not automatically protect defamatory statements.

For the most part, these figures attempted to remain below the threshold of actionable defamatory accusations by claiming they were merely raising questions rather than asserting false narratives. Yet questions can themselves be used rhetorically to insinuate claims without stating them directly. That technique can be manipulative and, depending on the circumstances, potentially as influential as Jones’s more explicit fabrications.

It is therefore unsurprising that, as conspiratorial politics became more prominent within parts of the MAGA movement, Jones returned to political circles after periods of being banned from major platforms and marginalized by more conventional political organizations.

He has developed a substantial following within parts of the MAGA-aligned far right. One example is his appearance in Christian nationalist political circles. His participation alongside activists who use the slogan “Christ is King” is significant. On its face, “Christ is King” is a traditional Christian profession of faith used by Christians across denominations and political orientations. In some far-right online contexts, however, the phrase has also been appropriated as a slogan associated with antisemitic or Christian nationalist rhetoric.

That distinction matters. The phrase itself is not inherently a statement of white supremacy or antisemitism. Its meaning depends on who is using it, toward whom it is directed, and in what context. In some extremist circles, it can function as a signal of exclusion toward Jews and other non-Christians.

The fact that Alex Jones, who is not a theologian, is invited as a prominent speaker at such political gatherings is itself an interesting development.

His legal troubles, the scrutiny surrounding the judgments against him, and the fact that he faces liabilities exceeding $1 billion from the Sandy Hook cases have not prevented political groups from associating with him. In some circles, those judgments may even reinforce his credibility because supporters can interpret him as a victim of hostile juries, progressive politics, or an establishment attempting to silence him.

Within that narrative, he is portrayed as innocent or unfairly maligned rather than as someone held legally responsible for defamatory falsehoods. His financial difficulties can likewise be incorporated into a persecution narrative in which supporters are encouraged to help him rebuild his platform and finances.

It is interesting that circumstances that might have discredited him with a broader audience can strengthen his reputation within particular political subcultures. Those circles have also become more visible. They are not representative of most Texans, Americans, Republicans, or Christians, but their participants appear increasingly willing to organize publicly, speak openly, and portray themselves as part of a legitimate political constituency rather than a marginalized fringe.

Jacobsen: This story has been developing for some time, although we have not covered it fully. Thousands of migrants in Ceuta remain in limbo while Spain tries to determine what to do with them. Do authorities return them, admit them temporarily, process asylum claims individually, or assign different legal statuses depending on their circumstances?

Many have gathered near the beach and city center, sleeping on cardboard or in makeshift shelters and keeping their few possessions in plastic bags. This reflects an ongoing humanitarian crisis in Ceuta.

In late July, more than 72,000 people attempted to enter the small Spanish territory from neighboring Morocco. Many subsequently returned, but estimates suggest roughly 5,000 to 10,000 migrants remained in the city weeks later. Ceuta itself has a population of about 84,000, so even the lower estimate represents a substantial and rapid influx relative to the city’s size. City estimates suggest that around 2,000 of those remaining could be minors. Aid organizations have been distributing food and other necessities.

The United Nations refugee agency has highlighted significant humanitarian and operational challenges in Ceuta and has urged authorities to process potential asylum claims quickly. The agency has estimated that roughly 1,200 people may qualify for international protection. Ceuta Mayor Juan Jesús Vivas has also criticized the national government of Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, arguing that Madrid has not done enough to manage the situation.

What are the broader geopolitical and domestic dimensions of this crisis?

Tsukerman: There are several dimensions to the story. One is geopolitical and concerns relations between Morocco and Spain. Morocco does not recognize Spanish sovereignty over Ceuta and Melilla, while Spain regards both as integral parts of its territory. Ceuta has a complicated history. Portugal captured it in 1415, and it later came under Spanish sovereignty, which Portugal formally recognized in the seventeenth century. Today, Ceuta is an autonomous Spanish city and one of the European Union’s only land borders with Africa.

Ceuta has long been a focal point for migration into Europe and for diplomatic tensions between Morocco and Spain. During a major crisis in 2021, Morocco relaxed border controls and thousands of migrants crossed into Ceuta amid a diplomatic dispute with Madrid. That history naturally influences interpretations of the present crisis.

There are also economic pressures within Morocco, particularly limited opportunities for young people. Many of those who crossed recently said they were seeking employment and a better future in Europe. Social media posts, misinformation and migrant-smuggling networks also appear to have helped encourage large numbers of people to attempt the crossing at roughly the same time.

Spain has meanwhile introduced an extraordinary regularization program for undocumented migrants already living in the country. It is not a blanket legalization of everyone who arrives. Eligibility is restricted, including requirements relating to when a person entered Spain and how long they have already resided there. More than half a million people had applied by May 2026. Because the program applies to people who were already in Spain before the recent Ceuta crisis, it does not provide an obvious legal pathway for the new arrivals.

There was also discussion of a Spanish Supreme Court ruling concerning deportations of migrants arriving by sea. Reports indicate that the ruling may have been misunderstood or misrepresented on social media and by smugglers, contributing to the belief that migrants reaching Ceuta would automatically be allowed to remain. That interpretation was inaccurate.

There are suspicions in some political circles that Moroccan authorities deliberately permitted the crossings or that foreign actors sought to exploit the situation. Those claims require caution. Moroccan border guards were reportedly passive during part of the initial surge but later intervened, and there is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the present influx was orchestrated by Islamists, Russia or the Moroccan government.

What is clear is that this was not simply the ordinary pattern of small numbers of migrants attempting crossings at different times. Tens of thousands moved toward Ceuta within a compressed period, creating an extraordinary humanitarian and administrative crisis.

Regardless of how the movement began, Spain now faces the immediate problem of identifying those who may qualify for asylum or other forms of international protection, caring for unaccompanied minors, providing temporary shelter and basic services, and determining what can legally be done with people who do not qualify to remain.

At the same time, Morocco and Spain have a strong incentive to prevent the migration issue from becoming another major bilateral confrontation. Ceuta has historically been sensitive precisely because questions of migration, sovereignty and diplomatic leverage intersect there. The humanitarian situation therefore cannot be separated entirely from the broader political relationship between Madrid and Rabat.

Many of these people appear to have been motivated primarily by economic opportunity, although it would be inaccurate to describe the entire group as economic migrants. Those who reached Ceuta included people from conflict-affected countries such as Sudan, Mali, and Yemen, and the U.N. refugee agency estimates that roughly 1,200 people may qualify for international protection. Spanish authorities are therefore required to assess individual cases rather than classify everyone in advance.

A significant number of migrants also appear to have misunderstood Spain’s recent immigration regularization program. That policy applies only to undocumented migrants who were already in Spain, arrived before January 1, 2026, and could demonstrate at least five months of residence. More than one million people applied before the application window closed. It did not create a legal pathway for people newly arriving in Ceuta.

There is evidence that misinformation surrounding both the regularization program and a recent Spanish Supreme Court ruling contributed to the surge. Social media posts falsely suggested that the border was effectively open or that migrants reaching Spanish territory would automatically be able to remain. The Supreme Court ruling was narrower. It required due process before migrants arriving by sea could be returned and did not provide a general right to remain in Spain.

That distinction matters. Spain may need migrant labor because of demographic and economic pressures, but its regularization policy does not mean that anyone who crosses the border irregularly will be accepted because the country needs workers. Immigration, asylum, labor-market policy, and border security operate under different legal frameworks.

Likewise, the fact that many migrants arrived without extensive possessions tells us little about whether they intended to work, settle permanently, or act in good faith. People making dangerous irregular crossings often travel with very little because carrying belongings can make the journey more difficult. Their lack of luggage is not itself a meaningful security indicator.

Many of those involved were young men, although women, children, and families were also among the arrivals. That demographic pattern can create political concern because young men often constitute a large proportion of irregular migration flows, but it does not establish that a particular group presents a security threat. Spain still has legitimate reasons to identify entrants, verify nationality and background, determine who qualifies for international protection, and decide who must leave. That is precisely the individual screening process authorities say they are undertaking.

European governments also have broader security concerns because irregular migration routes can be exploited by smugglers and criminal networks. Russia and other state actors have previously been accused of exploiting migration pressures elsewhere in Europe for political purposes. But there is no established evidence that the migrants who entered Ceuta in this episode were recruited by Russian, Islamist, or criminal organizations to conduct sabotage or violence.

The immediate causes appear more prosaic and, in some ways, more troubling: poverty, limited opportunities, social-media misinformation, misunderstandings of Spanish law, and the extraordinary speed with which rumors spread. Moroccan and Spanish officials have also pointed to smuggling networks, although some migrants said they acted independently after seeing information online.

That does not mean young people looking for better opportunities should simply be admitted without a process. A more rational system would create lawful pathways connecting workers with actual labor shortages while screening applicants for identity, security concerns, qualifications, and willingness to acquire needed skills.

As Bill Maher has put it, in effect, they need something closer to a LinkedIn account than a boat. The broader point is sound even if the problem is more complicated than the joke. If Spain needs additional workers, there should be organized recruitment and legal migration channels that connect prospective migrants with specific employment opportunities rather than leaving people to gamble their lives on rumors, smugglers, and dangerous border crossings.

I am sure there are unskilled and entry-level positions available as well. But migration driven by employment needs a more realistic plan than simply crossing a border and hoping that work appears. If someone arrives without documents, housing, contacts, or a lawful route into employment, that person becomes vulnerable to homelessness, exploitation, trafficking, and criminal networks.

That does not mean people arriving with few possessions lack seriousness or willingness to work. Irregular migrants often travel with very little because of the conditions of the journey itself. Nor can authorities assume that a person lacks employable skills simply because those skills have not yet been documented.

The larger problem is that an improvised border crossing is an extremely dangerous way to pursue economic opportunity. Spain has legitimate reasons to identify people, determine their legal status, assess asylum claims where applicable, protect minors, and decide whether others are eligible to remain or should be returned.

I am somewhat surprised by the number of people who remain in Ceuta despite having no clear legal pathway forward. But “refusing to leave” does not mean that authorities can simply arrest and deport everyone immediately. Some migrants have requested asylum, and the U.N. refugee agency estimates that around 1,200 of those remaining could qualify for international protection. Spanish and European law require individual procedures in such cases.

Most of those involved appear to have been motivated by economic hardship and lack of opportunity, particularly among young Moroccans. But the group is not legally homogeneous. Migrants from Sudan, Mali, Yemen, and other countries were also present, and some may have protection claims arising from persecution, war, or instability. It would therefore be inaccurate to say categorically that none are asylum seekers.

For those who have no valid protection claim or other legal basis to remain, Spain can pursue return procedures. Due process still matters. The recent Supreme Court controversy itself concerned the legality of immediate returns of migrants arriving by sea, not a general prohibition on deportation.

I have sympathy for people who were misled by false information about an open border, Spanish immigration policy, or their chances of reaching mainland Europe. Social-media rumors played a significant role in mobilizing the rush toward Ceuta. Spanish and Moroccan authorities have also blamed smuggling networks, although many migrants said they acted on information circulating online rather than through organized traffickers.

People who deliberately profit from smuggling migrants or spreading fraudulent promises should certainly be investigated and, where the evidence supports it, prosecuted. At the same time, individual migrants still make decisions and bear some responsibility for them. Being deceived helps explain a decision. It does not automatically create a legal entitlement to remain in another country.

Where I would separate employability from judgment is the suggestion that making a disastrous migration decision means somebody would necessarily make a bad employee. People can exercise terrible judgment in one context and still be capable workers. The more useful policy question is whether Spain can create legal pathways that assess actual skills, labor demand, security considerations, and willingness to work before people undertake dangerous journeys.

If Spain needs cleaners, agricultural workers, construction workers, care workers, hospitality staff, or people willing to train for those jobs, then there should be mechanisms connecting prospective workers with those vacancies. That would be considerably more rational than allowing social-media rumors and desperation to function as an informal immigration system.

Jacobsen: We have two related developments in the Asia-Pacific. The region is becoming more militarized and strategically fragmented.

In the context of Ukraine, there has been extensive discussion of foreign volunteers fighting for Ukraine, including volunteers from Western countries. There have also been documented cases of vulnerable foreign nationals being recruited, misled, or coerced into fighting for Russia, including people from parts of Africa and Asia.

North Korea has gone considerably further. It has supplied Russia with ammunition, missiles, and troops. North Korean forces have fought alongside Russian troops, particularly in Russia’s Kursk region. Russia and North Korea publicly confirmed the deployment in 2025, and South Korean intelligence has estimated that roughly 14,000 to 15,000 North Korean troops were sent to support Russia.

So, in terms of foreign conventional forces physically participating in combat, it is more accurate to describe this as Russia receiving direct North Korean military support against Ukraine. NATO has supplied Ukraine with weapons, intelligence, training, financing, and other assistance, but NATO as an alliance has not invoked Article 5 over Ukraine and has not deployed NATO combat forces to fight Russia there.

In that sense, there is a distinction between supporting a belligerent and directly deploying national armed forces into combat.

We are also seeing increased militarization across Asia. North Korea recently fired approximately 10 short-range ballistic missiles after the United States and South Korea sharply reduced and ended their Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise earlier than originally planned. President Donald Trump simultaneously signaled an interest in reopening direct diplomacy with Kim Jong Un. Trump and Kim met three times during Trump’s first presidency, but their negotiations collapsed in 2019.

The atmosphere around another possible meeting is much more serious now. North Korea has expanded its nuclear and missile capabilities and developed a much closer military relationship with Russia.

Taiwan, meanwhile, has proposed an 18 percent increase in defense spending for 2027, bringing planned expenditures to approximately NT$1.12 trillion, or about US$35 billion. That would put defense spending above 3 percent of Taiwan’s projected GDP, while President Lai Ching-te has set a longer-term goal of reaching 5 percent by 2030.

China continues to pressure countries in the region to avoid aligning too closely with Washington, while South Korea is trying to preserve extensive economic relations with China alongside its longstanding security alliance with the United States. Seoul is clearly much more closely aligned militarily with Washington than Beijing.

Myanmar’s civil war is also increasingly intersecting with Russian and Chinese strategic and economic interests. Russia is one of the military-backed government’s principal arms suppliers and political supporters. Moscow and Naypyitaw have discussed projects including a nuclear power plant, a seaport, oil refineries, and other infrastructure. China likewise maintains major political, economic, and security interests in Myanmar.

When we compare the Asia-Pacific with Europe and Eastern Europe, what are your thoughts on this increased militarization and strategic fragmentation?

Tsukerman: None of this emerged suddenly. Some of us have been watching the convergence among China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran for years. Their cooperation on defense, security, economic policy, and opposition to Western influence has grown substantially despite rivalries, divergent interests, cultural differences, and political mistrust.

I would be careful about calling them a formal four-country alliance. Russia and North Korea have gone much further institutionally than the others. Their 2024 Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty contains a mutual-assistance provision in the event of aggression. China also maintains a longstanding mutual-defense treaty with North Korea. Russia and Iran have deepened their strategic partnership, while China and Russia describe their relationship as increasingly close. But there is no NATO-style collective-defense treaty binding all four countries together.

What exists is a growing network of bilateral and multilateral relationships. These countries also cooperate through institutions such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS. There is significant economic, diplomatic, security, and political coordination, even though their interests are not identical and may eventually clash in areas such as Central Asia, energy markets, and regional influence.

When it comes to Western interests, however, they frequently converge in applying political pressure, sanctions evasion, information operations, military assistance, and other forms of confrontation. In some cases, that has escalated into open warfare.

I would distinguish carefully between hybrid warfare and conventional military action. Cyberattacks, sabotage, influence operations, economic coercion, covert activity, and deniable operations fit comfortably within the concept of hybrid warfare. An armed military drone deliberately crossing into another state’s sovereign territory and attacking a target can constitute a conventional use of force. Whether a particular incident legally reaches the threshold of an “armed attack” sufficient to trigger collective self-defense is a separate question under international law.

NATO’s treatment of individual incidents as falling below the Article 5 threshold does not mean those incidents are harmless. Article 5 is a political and legal mechanism for collective defense, not an automatic response to every military violation of sovereign territory.

As cooperation among Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea becomes more operationally integrated, their strategies increasingly affect supply chains, maritime routes, territorial disputes, energy markets, and regional conflicts.

A few years ago, I discussed with a maritime expert the possibility of overlapping maritime crises involving the Black Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, and the South China Sea and adjacent maritime chokepoints.

Russia’s Black Sea Fleet has suffered severe losses from Ukrainian attacks and has been forced to relocate much of its operational activity away from occupied Crimea, although it has not ceased to exist. Ukraine has nevertheless demonstrated how asymmetric capabilities, particularly missiles and maritime drones, can impose serious costs on a conventionally superior naval force.

Elsewhere, the pattern of strategic cooperation continues. Russia and Iran have exchanged military technology and materiel, including Iranian-designed drones used by Russia against Ukraine. North Korea has supplied Russia with millions of rounds of ammunition, ballistic missiles, artillery systems, and troops. China remains Russia’s most important major-power economic partner and has supplied large quantities of dual-use goods. Beijing officially denies providing lethal weapons for Russia’s war.

Claims that China or Russia directly helped Iran select specific American or Israeli targets require stronger evidence than is publicly available in many cases. What is well documented is broader military, technological, intelligence, diplomatic, and economic cooperation among these states.

In the South China Sea, China has become increasingly assertive through its navy, coast guard, maritime militia, artificial islands, and repeated confrontations with neighboring states. Beijing claims extensive areas that overlap with the exclusive economic zones of countries including the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. A 2016 international arbitral tribunal rejected the legal basis for China’s expansive “nine-dash line” claim, although Beijing refused to accept the ruling.

All of this is compounding. The trajectory is consistent with states pursuing separate but increasingly interconnected strategic objectives.

There is still rivalry among them. China and Russia compete for influence in Central Asia. Their interests are not identical in Africa or the Middle East. Iran has its own regional agenda. North Korea remains heavily dependent on China while simultaneously using its relationship with Russia to reduce that dependence.

Ukraine is nevertheless an obvious point of convergence because weakening Ukraine also imposes costs on NATO members and European governments supporting Kyiv.

Ukraine is not formally a NATO buffer state in any legal sense, but geographically it lies between Russia and several NATO and European Union members. The war has required European states to devote enormous financial, industrial, and military resources to Ukraine while simultaneously strengthening their own defenses.

At the same time, Russia has conducted cyber operations, sabotage, influence campaigns, GPS interference, and other hostile activities across Europe. Individual incidents vary considerably in attribution and severity, but the broader campaign of Russian hybrid activity against European states is extensively documented.

The Russia-North Korea relationship is especially significant. When their cooperation accelerated, many outside observers were skeptical that North Korea could contribute substantially. Some also expected China to resist an excessively close relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang.

Instead, Russia and North Korea signed a comprehensive strategic partnership treaty, exchanged high-level visits, expanded arms transfers, and developed direct battlefield cooperation. North Korea has benefited because its relationship with Moscow provides economic assistance, diplomatic support, potential access to technology, and practical military experience.

North Korea can also use improved relations with Russia to gain leverage in its relationship with China. Beijing remains North Korea’s dominant trading partner, but Pyongyang now has more room to maneuver between the two powers.

The battlefield experience is especially important. North Korean troops initially suffered significant casualties and reportedly struggled with drone warfare and aspects of modern combined-arms combat. But surviving personnel gain experience, and those lessons can be incorporated into training at home. Russia may also provide technical assistance derived from the war. South Korean assessments suggest that North Korean missile accuracy may already have improved through battlefield data and Russian technical support.

That could make North Korea more capable in any future confrontation on the Korean Peninsula. It also matters to Japan and other countries within range of North Korean missiles.

I would hesitate, however, to suggest that North Korean forces are likely to be deployed as mercenaries for China in Taiwan or for armed groups in Latin America without evidence. What we can say is that combat experience increases the military value of North Korean personnel and gives Pyongyang capabilities it did not previously possess.

North Korea has therefore been one of the significant beneficiaries of this relationship. It is less isolated diplomatically, more closely connected to Russia, and increasingly relevant to major-power security calculations for reasons extending beyond its nuclear arsenal.

That creates difficult questions for Ukraine. Should Kyiv increasingly treat North Korea as a direct participant in the war? To what extent should Ukraine deepen defense cooperation with South Korea? What forms of action against North Korean forces or military assets located in Russia are legitimate under the laws of armed conflict?

Ukraine has already urged South Korea to expand defense cooperation, particularly in air defense and drone technology. President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has also warned that additional North Korean deployments could follow, although Pyongyang has denied plans to send tens of thousands more troops and South Korea has said it sees preparations but no indication that another deployment is imminent.

At the same time, Trump abruptly ordered the reduction of the Ulchi Freedom Shield exercises with South Korea. The exercise was subsequently ended six days earlier than originally scheduled, and planned field exercises were also reduced. Trump has indicated that he wants renewed contact with Kim Jong Un.

North Korea had little reason to respond immediately. High-level diplomacy of this kind is usually prepared through extensive negotiations rather than spontaneous announcements. Kim Yo Jong publicly dismissed the reduction in exercises as insufficient, although she used relatively restrained language and acknowledged that the personal relationship between Trump and Kim remains good.

North Korea has positioned itself very differently from where it stood during Trump’s first-term diplomacy. It has a larger and more sophisticated nuclear and missile program, an operational military relationship with Russia, battlefield experience, and greater leverage between Moscow and Beijing. Any renewed negotiations therefore begin from a substantially different strategic balance.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer and Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 2,000 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic, media, and research institution fellowships, and currently serves on numerous international boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.