There is a topical feature in Scientific American, Consciousness Is a Continuum, and Scientists Are Starting to Measure It: A new technique helps anesthesiologists track changes in states of consciousness, stating that, “For instance, consciousness can be connected to the environment through our senses and behavior (connected consciousness), as in most of our waking hours, or disconnected from our surroundings (disconnected consciousness), as when we dream during sleep. Unconsciousness — as when someone is in a coma — is more difficult to study than connected or disconnected consciousness, but it is generally understood as a state of oblivion, void of subjective experience or memory. When we prepare a patient for surgery, we adjust the levels of anesthetic to render them unconscious. When someone is under general anesthesia, they are experiencing a temporary and reversible coma during which they feel no pain and after which they will have no memories of their procedure.”
“Generally, researchers track the onset of sedation by issuing verbal commands and recording behavioral responses. For instance, a scientist might periodically ask someone to open their eyes or push a button while receiving an anesthetic infusion. Once the person stops responding to this command, the scientist assumes they have lost connected consciousness.”
There is a recent column in Quanta Magazine, The Brain Region That Controls Movement Also Guides Feelings, stating that, “The principal type of neuron in the cerebellum, called the Purkinje cell, is widely branching like a fan coral, yet flattened and nearly two-dimensional. Each axon connects with the dendrites of tens of thousands of Purkinje cells. This level of interconnectivity gives the cerebellum’s 50 billion neurons an astonishing capacity for integration. This circuitry, unique to the cerebellum, can crunch enormous amounts of incoming data from the senses to regulate body movement. “
There is a new analysis in Scientific American, Brains Are Not Required When It Comes to Thinking and Solving Problems — Simple Cells Can Do It, stating that, “It turns out that regular cells — not just highly specialized brain cells such as neurons — have the ability to store information and act on it. These responses in plants are mediated by electric signals, just as they are in animals. And these and other plants can be knocked out by anesthetic gas. Their electric activity flatlines, and they stop responding as if unconscious. If RNA can be a medium of memory storage, any cell might have the ability, not just neurons. These revelations have put the biologist at the vanguard of a new field called basal cognition. Head cells in the flatworm Dugesia japonica have different bioelectric voltages than tail cells do. Switch the voltages around and cut off the tail, and the head will regenerate a second head. All cells in the body have channels in their membranes that act like voltage gates, allowing different levels of current to pass through them.”
How do these findings update how consciousness is contextualized? The cerebellum, for example, has been shown by studies to have no effect on consciousness, because if it is missing, consciousness is still possible, but the case is different for other parts of the brain.
Now, for the usual functions of—an available and working—cerebellum, is there no consciousness of them? Is the consciousness of any function in a different location from that function? Might this imply that the centers associated with consciousness mechanize certain functions whose loss takes the consciousness with it, rather than saying consciousness is just something at special brain circuits?
Are the reference points for consciousness more appropriately functional centers, where vital functions—and the consciousness—there are available and lost together?
If someone is visually impaired or challenged with hearing, the individual is conscious of other things aside from those functions. This may show that rather than consciousness as a possession of a few things, it can be available or lost for any function and that it is made in the same space.
The actions of organisms without brains that appear to be parallel to those with brains may point toward extras [or qualifiers] that calibrate functions, not just functions as plain continuums.
If every cell has electrical signals, which could also become a network by groups of cells, what else might bioelectricity imply? Why does a cell not mechanize all its possible functions, at the same intensity, concurrently? Why do groups of cells not carry out all the functions they can, at an equal rate, simultaneously?
This is another angle to approach consciousness, where there are functions and there are qualifiers of those functions. This means that functions are presented by their qualifications. The collection of all the qualifiers [or calibrators] is consciousness. Consciousness could be another purpose for bioelectricity, to qualify functions, along with molecules. Consciousness is highest in humans, but lower for other organisms. Consciousness is not one thing or the focus on one at an instance, but all the functions for which qualifiers can act on or define, through the lifecycle of an organism.
Electroencephalogram [EEG] is used to measure electrical signals in the brain, but how might it be possible to define waves by qualifiers of functions also, rather than by frequencies?
Response level checks to patients in the OR, for the effects of anesthesia can be described more directly as a free will request, not just for consciousness. This means that when a patient is asked to do something, before going into sedation or coming out of it, it is a request of free will of that patient, aside — for — awareness or the capability to carry it out.
Consciousness is not [directly] the response of a patient. Consciousness is a collection [that includes that response] of all the qualifiers of functions. For example, there is the muscular function, but there is the intent or control to open or close the eyes. This means that free will is a qualifier of that function. It is there, but acted upon or qualified into functionality level. Other principal qualifiers include attention, awareness and sense of self. There are others too, like distribution, splits, sequences, that qualify how functions come to be defined. Some qualifiers complete functions.
Under general anesthesia, according to EEG analysis, it is noticed that communication between different parts of the brain breaks down, making consciousness appear to be correlated with communication. If this does not mean activities at different sources go off, might it imply that the activity level [strong enough] to break into communication wanes?
Also, for the unified experience of consciousness, what happens? Since consciousness is a collection of qualifiers, possible across functions, how does it make determinations for a class in a moment? How is it also possible to segment EEG result, by the qualifiers of consciousness, to better grade anesthesia, locked-in syndrome, or minimal consciousness?
Simply, rather than seek waves, slowing, symmetry, synchrony, frequencies, spikes in montages to interpret for abnormalities or otherwise, it is possible to make inferences on each qualifier, across frequencies in EEG, plugging in measures of consciousness directly.
Mind
There is a distinction that can be made within the brain, for all functions. This distinction can be called the mind. The mind is theorized to be the collection of all the electrical and chemical impulses of neurons, with their features and interactions.
This means that for anything to be consequential to functions, it has to affect the electrical and chemical impulses of nerve cells. Brain centers are known to have several clusters of neurons. It is theorized that within each cluster, impulses there are in sets or loops. It is within sets that they organize information.
Simply, sets of electrical and chemical impulses — in clusters of neurons — are mini-collectives, where they interact, as well as have features that shape how they function.
There are functions that these sets operate. There are qualifiers of those functions. This means that the functions are in action as they are qualified. Functions and qualifications often occur in the same sets of impulses.
There are qualifications [of functions] that are similar or parallel to features [of sets of impulses]. There are others that standout. There are at least four standard qualifiers of functions: attention, awareness, the self and intent.
These labels are explanatory, not how sets of impulses differentiate them. Awareness may indicate other things, but here it means below attention. For example, main vision is attention, peripheral vision is awareness.
It is theorized that in a set, there are formations or configurations of chemical impulses, where functions are defined or information is organized. Simply, chemical impulses in a set have rations which are aggregated to define how something functions. For example, it could be A2468, with the figures as rations of chemical impulses, and the letter a bundle of the electrical impulse that came in. The function could be modulation, memory, feeling, emotion and so on.
Conceptually, electrical impulses often strike to interact with chemical impulses, forming a brief fused state, resulting in access to that configuration. Electrical impulses can then carry on a piece of the function and qualification as a piecemeal bundle, elsewhere. This brief fuse, resulting in experience, explains the hard problem.
How are functions qualified? What is in a set of impulses?
a.
Brain science has established that one neuron is connected to thousands of others. This means that in a cluster of neurons there are several synapses within. There are also back and forth projections of axons from elsewhere. For example, dopamine neurons project across, making contributions of dopamine, within theirs and to different clusters. This makes dopamine implicated in several functions. This is similar to several other chemical impulses. It also limits how to exactly influence a chemical impulse for a function due to how the exact ration for that function may not be known.
b.
It is theorized here that in a cluster of neurons, where sets of impulses can be obtained, that there are active and less active synapses. This means that while some neurons — in a cluster — are excited, they send chemical impulses through their axons, but not equally to all its terminals. So, there could be priority dendrites, than others, which could be defined by receptors on those or other factors.
c.
In a set of impulses, since there is a start and an end point of the collection of synapses involved, some of the inactive ones are helpful in qualifying the functions operated by that set, aside from how the active ones also have variations.
The capacity for rations in all the sets of impulses is seldom absolute or filled by rations. It is often fractions to the maximum, but the highest obtainable fraction in any moment is prioritization, or what is termed as attention. Whatever set of impulses has the highest ration in any instance is the most prioritized across all. All other impulses are pre-prioritized, which makes them to be in awareness or less.
It is this attention or just one prioritized set of impulses in a moment, with the highest ration, say 70% or so, that drives consciousness and is responsible for what is called the unified conscious experience, explaining the binding problem.
It is established in brain science that there are some strong synapses, or Hebbian. It is theorized here that along the breadth of the set, there is often a change in concentration, from end to end. This means that some are strong, in an instance, while others may be weak. This change is theorized to be responsible for the sense of self, which is what makes experiences subjective. Simply, as fill and drop occur across the breadth of synapses, it makes the experience to be of the self.
It is also theorized that some sets of impulses have certain special spaces that do not get fully covered, which is where intent, control or free will is carried out from. This means that wherever there are these spaces, it is possible to have control. Where there isn’t, it is not possible. This makes some external parts easier to control, while some internal parts are not.
There are some patients under general anesthesia or coming out of it that may have awareness of their environment, from some set of impulses, but may not have intent or free will.
Another important feature is distribution, where the qualification, mostly of prioritization, is distributed from one set of impulses, to others. This distribution, or lead, often forms an array. So, when a set is prioritized [or in attention] it gets to start an array, where it distributes to, catching other sets of impulses. This sometimes occurs as well with pre-prioritization but not much.
Distribution is one of the most important feature and qualifier of functions. When electrodes are placed within the CNS, they, conceptually, also foster distribution. They may increase the options to destinations to sets [of impulses] or catch signal. Distributions decide many aspects of mental health and problems, where, for example, the memory of something is not distributed to the traumatic experience. Distributions are important markers of the direction of functions.
When SSRIs work in major depression, by blocking serotonin reuptake, leaving a lot in the synaptic cleft, it is theorized that it disrupts part of the spaces within a set that should be available for qualification of functions. This upends sets of impulses, with more serotonin rations. It however helps to remove a feature — of prioritized sets of impulses — called the principal spot, where the heaviness in a depression is, conceptually, decided.
So, when a prioritized set or some, stay longer at the top of arrays, they get to a principal spot, where those sets have the most domination. However, with the flush of serotonin, it allows for other sets to compete or displace those sets for heaviness, relieving MDD symptoms in that interval.
Consciousness, conceptually, can also be explained by lead arrays and their support. This means that one array leads during wakefulness—with interchanging options or support arrays. The same applies during deep sleep. Dreams—in the same form as wakeful imagination—during sleep are arrays that may lead or support without resulting in wakefulness.
If there is a sharp pain, a loud sound, a bright light, or some striking touch during sleep, it becomes a lead array that can take over from
the main, of sleep, to result in wakefulness even though sleep arrays remain options.
Under general anesthesia or in a coma, arrays are theorized to be weaker. The arrays that are weaker can be for functions that include those that
collect for wakefulness, as well as those of sleep. This means the functions and qualifiers do not break the threshold to become lead arrays, thereby resulting in those states. During sleep, if the pain, light, sound or touch was not intense, it would not break the threshold.
So, what is called the loss of consciousness are certain functions not breaking into lead arrays that result in or sustain wakefulness, it
does not mean consciousness is only possible at some centers.
EEG
How is it possible to interpret the results of EEG by prioritization [or attention], pre-prioritization [awareness or less], self, intent and distribution?
What is referred to as communication breakdown is distribution breakdown, where there is not enough prioritization from the source [set], to allow for others to get it. This means that whenever there is a distribution breakdown, there is already attention [or prioritization] breakdown.
This, for sets [of impulses] means less than the minimum ration for prioritization. This leaves rations in pre-prioritization [which is awareness or less]. Most times, less than awareness, but still functional, which is what happens [normally] for many internal senses, operating without awareness.
If there is attention or prioritization, there is likely to be distribution, but this does not mean there will be intent. There may or may not also be a sense of self. There could be awareness too. There are other qualifiers like arrays as well as splits. Split explains what is termed readiness potential, as well as predictive coding, processing and prediction error.
In brain science, it is known that electrical leap from node to node over myelinated axons, in what is called saltatory conduction.
It is postulated here that in a set, some electrical impulses split from others, to interact with chemical impulses, like before, if it matches then processing continues, if not, the incoming electrical impulses would interact properly, within that set or elsewhere. This corrects what is labeled prediction error.
This early split explains predictive coding. It also explains how short term memory works, to encode and then the incoming to retrieve. It also explains readiness potential, where some go-ahead, showing activity before others follow.
Splits are a qualifier of functions. It can also be measured or placed for what to observe, not just to assume that it is an activity but to know that this indicates splits, or for the label of prediction or others.
EEG may be more useful across situations, if they can be explained by the qualifiers of functions, include for ictal and interictal EEG.
AI
The way consciousness calibrates or qualifies functions in the human mind can be used to assess how AI calibrates digital contents. This may provide a better context on where they are or might be heading, away from the assumption they are just prediction machines that know or understands nothing.
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This Post is republished on Medium.
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Photo credit: iStock
