Everywhere Insiders 45: Iran, Nigeria, Taiwan, China, and Security Risks

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine escalating geopolitical flashpoints: Iran’s ship seizures near Hormuz, Nigeria’s coup allegations, Boko Haram violence, Taiwan’s blocked Africa trip, China’s influence in Africa, and suspicious deaths among sensitive-field scientists. Tsukerman emphasizes public perception, weak U.S. strategy, fragmented states, and the need for evidence-based investigations rather than premature certainty, while Jacobsen frames the discussion through current events and cautious global skepticism today.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: I am forgetting what is new in the world. Iran has seized two ships in or near the Strait of Hormuz after Mr. Trump extended the ceasefire. That is a little misleading, because it sounds more dramatic than it is. It was two ships. The United States, meanwhile, has continued its naval pressure and has reportedly seized or pursued Iran-linked oil shipments.

The United States wants a unified Iranian response; I do not know exactly what that means. Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian said that the U.S. breach of commitments, blockade measures, and threats are the main obstacles to “genuine negotiations.”

I do not think that is entirely unreasonable on its face. What are your thoughts on Iran’s seizure of the two ships?

Irina Tsukerman: I assume they are commercial vessels, possibly tankers or cargo ships. The effectiveness of the U.S. seizures was almost immediately counteracted by Iran’s seizure of two ships. That creates a tit-for-tat dynamic and a false moral equivalency: one party seizes ships, and the other party seizes ships.

Even if what the Trump administration is doing is justified, if the ships are carrying Iranian oil, enriching an adversarial power, and helping fund attacks on neighboring countries, U.S. targets, or U.S. allies, the situation is still being perceived as equivalent to Iran’s actions. The administration has not explained the distinction effectively to the public. That creates the impression that one side is no better than the other.

At best, it appears to be a geopolitical dispute, rather than a situation involving significant moral, legal, and strategic differences. Iran has sponsored armed groups across the region, committed severe human rights abuses, and repeatedly threatened Israel and U.S. interests. The United States presents its actions as an effort to constrain Iran’s regional and nuclear ambitions.

However, none of this comes across clearly in how Trump is handling the situation. He has framed much of this in terms of geopolitical leverage rather than human rights or international law. If everything is presented as a scramble for power, with no moral or ethical distinction, then why should anyone side with the U.S., especially when, from the perspective of an average observer, Washington appears to have escalated after threats, pressure, and stalled negotiations?

People might conclude that they should stay out of it and let events play out, or that the U.S. should stop so normalcy can resume. I do not agree with that perspective, but I do think the Trump administration is handling this poorly and giving Iran rhetorical ammunition.

There have been arguments that President Pezeshkian has limited room to maneuver, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) remains a decisive power center. But people often misunderstand the Iranian presidency. The president, foreign minister, and cabinet officials have never had ultimate authority over core national-security decisions. Real power rests with the Supreme Leader, the security apparatus, and institutions such as the IRGC.

These officials do not have final decision-making authority. They are often used as political interlocutors or mouthpieces for the regime, especially in dealings with the West. Some Western observers prefer to treat them as conventional political actors, because that makes diplomacy seem more familiar and manageable.

If it were widely understood that these figures lack ultimate authority, there might be a reassessment of how the regime operates. Iran does not behave like a typical liberal-democratic state actor. There is an ideological and doctrinal component that must be accounted for when analyzing Iranian motivations. That factor is missing from many current political approaches.

Jacobsen: Over to Nigeria. Six suspected Nigerian coup plotters have pleaded not guilty, and a court in Abuja has adjourned the trial. They are accused of planning a violent overthrow of President Bola Tinubu’s government. Prosecutors filed 13 criminal charges against a retired army major general and others, including treason, terrorism, and terrorism financing. A seventh suspect, reportedly a former state governor, remains at large.

Nigeria has also moved to avert a domestic airline shutdown with debt relief. President Tinubu approved 30% debt relief for local airlines, and the government is setting up a committee to review taxes, levies, and fees on domestic tickets. That is the more bureaucratic side of things.

Then, not coup-related, suspected Boko Haram militants killed at least 20 people in northeastern Nigeria around April 22. The attacks took place in communities along the Borno–Adamawa border, including Pubagu in Borno State and Mayo-Ladde in Adamawa State. This comes amid a broader surge in attacks by Boko Haram and Islamic State-linked militants, including ISWAP.

So, a lot is going on in Nigeria. What are your thoughts on these issues: the alleged coup plot, the airline debt relief and tax review, and the killing of 20 people by suspected Boko Haram militants?

Tsukerman: In the past few years, we have seen a series of actual, disrupted, and sometimes dubious coup allegations, particularly in West Africa, but also in Central African countries. The last coup accusation I remember involved Congo, though there may have been others around the same time. One of those alleged plots seemed completely preposterous. It involved random people with no serious access to power supposedly plotting to remove a leader.

The Nigerian coup allegation seems somewhat more plausible because it involves former security officials, including ex-military figures. At least they would know how a coup works and may have retained some military links. Still, it seems somewhat implausible because they are currently outside the formal power structure. In Africa, military coups and attempted coups are not uncommon, especially in recent years, but former military people may have a harder time pulling one off because they are not part of the current command system.

So it could go either way. Nigeria has become more unstable in recent years. There has been Russian influence, Iranian recruitment activity, separatist agitation, jihadist spillover from the Sahel, serious terrorist violence, corruption, and weak law enforcement. There have also been accusations that the government has failed to protect Christian communities from mass violence, though I find the strongest versions of the “Christian genocide” framing less credible without more careful evidence.

Nigeria is indeed a very troubled country. It is no surprise that unstable elements and people seeking power outside the normal electoral process might emerge. But I still find it questionable why this particular group would attempt a coup now instead of waiting for the next electoral opening.

Jacobsen: So, it is a good topic.

Tsukerman: Yes. To wrap up Nigeria, it could go either way. The Nigerian state is fragmented. The government is not especially popular, and there have been significant security problems, including terrorist activity, abductions, and threats. As we have seen again, jihadist attacks continue to materialize.

On the other hand, because of this internal fragmentation, the government may also have an incentive to crack down on critics and accuse them of plotting when they may simply be pushing for a different policy line, reforms, or the removal of inefficient or incompetent loyalists aligned with the head of state.

So it is hard to know what the story really is. Nigeria has not been the most transparent country. For a long time, it has been a close U.S. counterpart in Africa and a major, growing player in many ways. But it is also beset by assorted problems, which makes it difficult to determine when the government can be trusted and when we need to be more skeptical of its claims.

Jacobsen: China has praised the blocking of Taiwan President Lai Ching-te’s Africa trip. Seychelles, Mauritius, and Madagascar denied overflight permission, forcing Lai to cancel a planned trip to Eswatini, one of Taiwan’s few remaining diplomatic allies. China praised those decisions, while Taiwan accused Beijing of coercion.

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Also, Africa and Southeast Asia helped drive China’s solar panel exports to a record in March. Chinese solar panel exports surged to 1.75 million metric tons, valued at $3.61 billion, with demand rising sharply in Southeast Asia and Africa.

Many people are aware of the very rapid development of solar energy in China, which may help cushion some of the impacts of recent oil shocks. And, naturally, China would praise the blocking of the Taiwanese president’s trip to Africa. For historical context, Taiwan is right to be afraid, because the People’s Republic of China has an explicit history of absorbing territories, including Tibet.

Tsukerman: Here is the issue. A couple of things are going on. First, right before this attempted visit, the head of the opposition party in Taiwan publicly visited China, which generated significant attention. She does not currently hold government power, but the visit sent a strong political signal.

There has been gridlock inside the Taiwanese government, along with a series of espionage investigations that have led to convictions. In other words, China has had some success in recruiting Taiwanese individuals for intelligence purposes. There has also been a major political dispute over the ruling party’s energy policy. Taiwan has taken a strongly anti-nuclear stance and has become more dependent on imported energy sources, including fossil fuels. It has struggled to diversify, which leaves it in a vulnerable position from an energy security perspective, especially if the Taiwan Strait were disrupted by China.

So Taiwan is in a politically and strategically fraught position. At the same time, China appears to have successfully influenced several African countries to deny overflight access, effectively blocking that trip. That raises several questions. Why has the United States been relatively passive? Is it not in the U.S. interest to ensure that Taiwan maintains access to regions such as Africa, which are important for critical minerals supply chains that feed semiconductor production, an industry vital to the U.S. and its allies?

Is it not also incumbent on the U.S. to counter China’s growing influence in Africa, given that this could restrict access to those same resources? Why is the U.S. allowing China to project influence in ways that directly affect great-power competition?

If there are claims that U.S. pressure in regions such as the Strait of Hormuz is partly about countering China, then there are arguably more effective ways to do so, particularly through political and economic competition rather than actions that risk broader energy disruptions affecting allies.

All of this raises questions about U.S. strategy. While Taiwan could have taken earlier steps to mitigate this situation, there are certainly alternative diplomatic routes to Africa beyond relying on countries within China’s sphere of influence. It is also notable that the U.S. did not visibly support its ally in a matter that is politically significant yet does not require military escalation.

If the U.S. is unwilling or unable to act in such a limited case, can it be relied upon in the event of a serious military threat to Taiwan? That is a serious concern. If I were advising Taiwan, I would suggest reassessing its security posture and reducing reliance on any single external guarantor. At present, I do not think Taiwan is fully doing that.

The decision to cancel the trip after facing these obstacles also reinforces China’s narrative of strength and influence. It suggests that China can shape outcomes beyond its borders. That is a troubling signal and could foreshadow broader strategic and policy challenges.

Jacobsen: A lot of economic issues last week. Let us close on a speculative note, though I try not to lean too heavily on speculation. There has been a pattern of deaths involving scientists, nuclear physicists and other technically skilled individuals working in sensitive or classified fields.

Is this a real pattern? Is it media amplification? Or something in between? In some cases, it could be coincidence, an accident, illness, or unrelated circumstances. In others, something more deliberate may have occurred. What is happening with these scientists?

Tsukerman: The bottom line is that nobody knows, and that is the problem. Dismissing these cases outright as conspiracy theories, or definitively claiming they are coordinated actions by a foreign or domestic intelligence service, are both premature conclusions.

In at least one reported case, a scientist disappeared without clear explanation. In another, a scientist reported receiving threats, and her death was ruled a suicide, despite questions raised publicly about the circumstances. There are multiple plausible explanations: mental health issues, misinterpretation of threats, accidents, or other factors.

However, many of these individuals were working in highly sensitive areas, including advanced energy research such as nuclear or fusion-related work. That alone justifies closer scrutiny. It does not prove foul play, but it does mean these cases should be carefully investigated.

Questions remain: Were there credible threats? Was there evidence of surveillance or coercion? Did any of these individuals leave abruptly under unusual circumstances? These are precisely the kinds of issues investigations are meant to address.

It is not reasonable to conclude there is nothing there simply because no clear pattern has been publicly confirmed. At the same time, it is equally unreasonable to assert, without evidence, that there is a coordinated campaign targeting scientists. The truth could lie somewhere in between.

A balanced approach would involve serious, evidence-based investigations by appropriate authorities. If these incidents are coincidental, that conclusion should be established clearly. If there are risks to scientists working in sensitive fields, then improved security measures should be considered.

Taking reports of threats seriously is also important. If individuals raise concerns about their safety, those concerns should not be dismissed outright.

Ultimately, it is too early to draw firm conclusions. However, the decision by U.S. institutions, including federal investigative bodies and congressional oversight, to examine these cases more closely is appropriate. It is better to investigate thoroughly than to ignore potential risks in strategically important fields.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 1,900 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.