Everywhere Insiders 58: China’s AI Strategy and Far-Left Extremism

How could China overtake U.S. AI leadership, and why does far-left terrorism policy require stronger legal evidence?

Irina Tsukerman is a New York-registered human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and journalist. She earned a B.A. in International/Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006 and a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She is president of Scarab Rising, Inc., editor-in-chief of The Washington Outsider, and fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and the Arabian Peninsula Institute. Her work focuses on foreign policy, information warfare, security, and Middle Eastern affairs. She serves as Written Content Vice Chair of the American Bar Association’s Science and Technology Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine China’s accelerating challenge to United States leadership in artificial intelligence and the legal weaknesses of Washington’s campaign against far-left extremism. Tsukerman highlights critical-mineral dependence, talent shortages, inconsistent technology controls, research funding cuts, and fragmented alliances. She also argues that democratic governments must distinguish decentralized ideologies from provable terrorist organizations, pursue evidence-based investigations, and confront violence across the political spectrum rather than privileging partisan narratives alone.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Okay, let’s start with President Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Communist Party of China. Xi has presented a vision of broader international cooperation on artificial intelligence, particularly involving developing countries, while opposing a system dominated by the United States or any single country. China has also proposed a World Artificial Intelligence Cooperation Organization, which could emerge as a counterpart to U.S.-led arrangements such as the Pax Silica initiative.

Xi’s speech came as Chinese open-weight AI models were rapidly narrowing the performance gap with leading proprietary models from OpenAI and Anthropic. So, there is an international competition, driven principally by the United States and China, for AI influence and technological leadership. We are seeing a Chinese-led cooperation framework developing alongside the American-led Pax Silica framework.

What is your take on this highly competitive sphere and the emergence of cooperative efforts among China and other countries under Chinese leadership?

Irina Tsukerman: If we continue the way we are going, my prediction is that, within five years, China will become the dominant power in that area. I’ll explain why.

Currently, China remains at a disadvantage in some areas because its strongest models do not consistently outperform the most advanced U.S. systems across every capability. However, Chinese open-weight models have been closing the gap rapidly and, on some benchmarks and tasks, are already competitive with leading American models.

Quite frankly, China has also benefited from extensive access to Western research, technology, intellectual property, and technical expertise. There have been repeated allegations and documented cases of intellectual-property theft involving Chinese actors, although it would be too broad to attribute all of China’s AI progress to theft. China has also made major domestic investments in research, engineering, infrastructure, and education.

Several factors have changed the situation. First, there is China’s dominance in the processing and refining of many critical minerals and rare-earth elements. The United States has not yet overcome that dependency. China’s export controls and licensing restrictions have made some materials difficult for American companies to obtain, and the United States still lacks sufficient domestic refining capacity for several strategically important minerals.

That does not mean the United States has completely abandoned export controls against China. It means that American controls on advanced technology exist alongside a serious vulnerability to Chinese restrictions on mineral supplies. China retains substantial leverage because of its position in mineral processing and refining.

Second, Trump’s tariff war with much of the world has backfired in significant respects. The U.S. Supreme Court found that many tariffs imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act were unlawful. The government has consequently had to refund tens of billions of dollars to eligible importers. Businesses had already absorbed higher costs, altered supply chains, or passed costs on to consumers before those refunds began.

The tariffs have also complicated relationships with important commercial partners and potential suppliers of raw materials, including India.

India and the United States have been negotiating an interim trade agreement, but the negotiations have been delayed and complicated by changes in American tariff policy and by disagreements over market access. India now has greater leverage to insist on more favourable terms, although both governments continue to say that negotiations are progressing.

The longer the United States and India take to conclude an agreement, the longer it may take for American companies to gain more reliable access to alternative Indian suppliers. However, India cannot immediately replace China across the critical-minerals supply chain. India is still developing its extraction, processing, and export capacity in several areas, including lithium and rare-earth elements. Scaling that production will take time.

The third issue is the war involving Iran. It has disrupted energy and fertilizer supply chains, particularly those passing through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz. Fertilizer shipments have been interrupted, and prices for some products have risen sharply. These disruptions threaten food production and food prices, especially in developing countries that depend heavily on imported fertilizer and energy.

Some countries that might otherwise invest in competing with China in minerals, manufacturing, or infrastructure now have to devote more resources to energy security, food security, and immediate economic pressures. That does not eliminate them as competitors, but it can slow their development. The longer these disruptions continue, the harder it will be for alternative supply chains to catch up.

The fourth element is the talent base. The United States has faced persistent shortages in certain technical occupations related to semiconductors, advanced manufacturing, and AI. This problem predates Trump. Industry projections have warned that tens of thousands of new semiconductor positions could remain unfilled if current education and training trends continue.

There are many reasons for this, including the length of technical training, competition for specialized workers, weaknesses in domestic workforce development, and immigration barriers that make it harder to recruit or retain foreign specialists.

As a result, the United States risks losing part of its early advantage. It still leads in many frontier technologies, research institutions, chip-design capabilities, and advanced AI systems. However, technological leadership is not permanent. If the United States fails to secure supply chains, maintain international partnerships, train enough workers, attract global talent, and invest consistently in research, China could close the remaining gaps and eventually move ahead.

Furthermore, the shortage of applicants is only one part of the problem. The other part is whether the workers already positioned to conduct semiconductor research, development, and manufacturing can meet the industry’s requirements.

Consider TSMC’s operations in Arizona. Taiwanese managers and American workers have reported serious differences in workplace culture, management practices, training, hours, and expectations. Some Taiwanese personnel have complained about the experience and commitment of American workers. American workers, in turn, have criticized TSMC’s hierarchical management culture, demanding schedules, and safety practices. So, it would be inaccurate simply to say that American workers are not good enough. However, the cultural and technical mismatch is a serious problem.

Another issue, of course, is migration and visa policy. The United States has restricted immigration and visa access so severely that even people who would ordinarily qualify face significant financial, administrative, and personal obstacles to entering the country. Some are deterred by concerns that they could be detained, denied entry, deported, or exposed to legal or political consequences. They do not want to deal with that uncertainty and unpleasantness, despite the significant career opportunities offered by some of these positions.

We are therefore facing shortages at both ends, among domestic workers and potential foreign workers. All of this is giving China significant breathing room.

Finally, the United States has been inconsistent in restricting China’s access to advanced technology. The Trump administration authorized limited exports of relatively advanced AI chips, including Nvidia’s H200, to approved Chinese customers under licensing conditions. That is certainly not the only factor helping China gain traction, but access to these chips could accelerate the process.

The Trump administration has also discussed the possibility of the federal government acquiring stakes in major AI companies. It has not yet broadly taken equity positions in the leading AI laboratories. On the one hand, government investment could stabilize companies, signal confidence, and provide leverage for accelerating capacity-building.

On the other hand, it could be perceived as government meddling in highly competitive industries. It could harm competition if the government begins selecting winners and backs companies that are not innovating effectively or abandoning failed approaches quickly enough. China could exploit those mistakes.

Admittedly, China exercises far greater control over strategically sensitive industries than the U.S. government does. At the same time, China has operated this model effectively for quite some time and has invested substantially in AI research, infrastructure, education, and industrial development. The United States is still not moving quickly enough in some of these areas.

So, the United States risks doing too much and too little simultaneously. It may intervene selectively without exercising the coordinated control found in China, while also failing to invest at a level sufficient to match China’s long-term industrial strategy.

Another problem along those lines is that China can coordinate much of the industry through the state, state-owned enterprises, government-supported companies, universities, and research institutions. The United States cannot, and probably should not, replicate that system completely. Part of America’s success has come from competitive private-sector innovation.

The problem is that there is now a considerable disconnect between some private companies and the government’s internal technical capacity. There is a misalignment in public-private cooperation that is not particularly helpful. China has been pursuing coordinated investment in AI for longer and has invested aggressively both domestically and internationally. That is another problem.

The United States has signed partnerships with countries such as the United Arab Emirates to strengthen its position in the competition with China and build a network of clients and partners around the world. However, the UAE is not necessarily working exclusively within a U.S.-led system such as Pax Silica. The United States has eased restrictions on Emirati access to advanced AI chips, but concerns remain about the UAE’s historical technological and commercial relationships with China.

We could therefore see Middle Eastern and other countries becoming gateways through which Chinese companies gain access to markets, expertise, infrastructure, or technology. The United States may obtain some benefits from these relationships. Gulf investment can help advance the American AI sector.

However, if these countries simultaneously maintain close relationships with China, they may also allow Chinese companies to experiment in their markets, build commercial influence, or gain access to sensitive knowledge. The risk of intellectual-property leakage must be managed rather than assumed, but it is a legitimate concern.

An element of exclusivity is therefore missing from many of these relationships. Several countries do not necessarily have to choose between Pax Silica and a Chinese-led AI coalition. They may attempt to work with both.

Yet another element is the European Union. The EU is behind the United States and China in the development of frontier AI models and the scale of major AI companies. Its principal influence is regulatory. The European regulatory environment is generally more restrictive than that of the United States.

The United States still has a comparatively fragmented and permissive regulatory system. China is taking advantage of the differences between the American and European approaches to frame its own international AI initiatives as alternative mechanisms for cooperation, governance, and standard-setting.

This is not only about research. It is also about regulation. If the United States does not determine how to shape the international regulatory landscape or respond effectively to European rules, it will face challenges in various parts of the world. Global AI standards could increasingly be defined by parties other than the United States, potentially to China’s advantage.

The final key element explaining why the United States runs a serious risk of falling behind is China’s investment in universities, government laboratories, state-supported companies, private companies, and foreign research sectors.

The United States, meanwhile, has reduced or threatened research funding for some universities for political and policy reasons that are not necessarily related to AI or semiconductors. One could argue that some forms of funding leverage are legitimate or justifiable for other reasons. Regardless of the rationale, prolonged uncertainty and funding reductions can encourage researchers to leave leading American institutions.

In recent years, China has intensified its efforts to recruit prominent international scientists. One notable example is Nobel Prize-winning chemist Omar Yaghi, who announced that he would leave the University of California, Berkeley, to direct a new institute in China combining artificial intelligence, chemistry, and materials research.

American scientists are not always receiving equivalent opportunities, whether financially, institutionally, or in terms of prestige. The Trump administration appears more concerned with being seen as fighting universities over ideological and political disputes than with ensuring that the research programmes essential to competition with China remain adequately funded.

These misaligned priorities are damaging America’s prospects. The effects may not be immediate, but they will become increasingly apparent over time.

Jacobsen: There is major news out of the United States. This particular item concerns Secretary of State Marco Rubio. Rubio is arguing that left-wing violence has been ignored. I am not presenting that as an established description of the situation. It is the position Rubio is advancing.

Since November 2025, Washington has designated four European groups associated with militant anti-fascist or anarchist activity as foreign terrorist organizations. Rubio has now told representatives from more than 60 countries that the United States intends to refocus international counterterrorism efforts on what he calls “far-left terror.”

He is arguing that far-left violence has been overlooked and that governments must begin combating it systematically. He said, “We can and we must identify and map this threat and rebuild our terrorism architecture to defeat it.”

What are your thoughts on this effort, its apparent scale, and this nationally led international re-emphasis on far-left political violence?

Tsukerman: I am not going to say that Rubio does not have a point because, politically speaking, he does. I think it is true that left-wing violence has sometimes been overlooked in the United States and elsewhere. We have seen violent incidents associated with far-left movements, including attacks connected to antisemitism in Europe, the United States, Canada, and other countries.

That said, the legal question is more complicated than Rubio has publicly acknowledged.

For one thing, many countries would not necessarily classify the entities designated by the United States as terrorist organizations. In some cases, they might not even recognize them as coherent organizations. Many of the people involved are not members of formally structured groups. They may participate in movements or informal networks, or they may be ideological fellow travellers who move fluidly from one cause to another while borrowing ideological, methodological, and operational elements from several camps.

Some of these people are certainly capable of illegal and violent action, and some have engaged in it. However, their coordination is often so loose and haphazard that proving the existence of a centrally directed terrorist organization, comparable to ISIS or al-Qaeda, becomes much more difficult.

The United States has nevertheless designated four named European groups as foreign terrorist organizations. Other countries may be more sceptical about applying similar labels, particularly when dealing with decentralized movements rather than identifiable organizations.

Arguably, some far-left movements have also been exploited by foreign adversaries, including Russia, as instruments for destabilizing Western countries. In particular cases, individuals or networks could be investigated as foreign agents or proxies. There may also be an identifiable hierarchy or infrastructure at a higher level, although that must be demonstrated with evidence rather than assumed.

The United Kingdom, for example, proscribed Palestine Action under the Terrorism Act 2000 because it was dealing with a concrete organization, a recognizable leadership structure, a stated agenda, and a record of organized direct action, including serious property damage. That decision remains deeply controversial, but it illustrates the legal difference between identifying a particular organization and attempting to designate a broad ideological tendency.

Palestine Action can be situated within a wider radical-left and pro-Palestinian activist environment that sometimes overlaps with Islamist or other extremist movements. However, those relationships must be established specifically. They cannot simply be inferred from shared slogans or participation in the same demonstrations.

When we are talking not about a named organization such as Palestine Action but about a loose label such as Antifa, the problem becomes much harder. Antifa is usually better understood as a decentralized movement or political orientation than as one national organization with formal membership, centralized leadership, and a unified source of funding.

There is a significant difference between calling oneself anti-fascist, participating in protests, or adopting radical slogans, and belonging to an identifiable organization that plans violent acts, raises funds, maintains leadership structures, and directs its members operationally.

There have been self-described anti-fascist activists who committed arson, assaulted police officers, damaged property, or used incendiary devices. Those people can and should be investigated and prosecuted for specific crimes. The more difficult task is proving that their conduct was directed by a larger terrorist organization rather than committed by individuals or small autonomous groups.

What makes the matter even more complicated is that radical movements sometimes operate through front groups, informal coalitions, nonprofit organizations, fiscal sponsors, or advocacy networks that also receive funding from lawful and mainstream sources. Money can be redirected, obscured, or used improperly. However, describing that process as money laundering requires evidence of a specific financial crime. Political disagreement or indirect financial support is not enough.

Because the administration has not clearly defined these groups, identified their structures, or publicly demonstrated how foreign adversaries are weaponizing them toward particular ends, the U.S. government risks taking a lazy, reactionary, and emotionally driven approach.

It has entered a debate about groups that call themselves Antifa without adequately explaining to the public what Antifa is, which entities are being targeted, and what evidence connects them to coordinated terrorism. That argument has therefore been dismissed by many academics, civil-liberties advocates, and legal scholars, partly because Antifa does not exist as a single registered national organization.

Calling Antifa itself a terrorist organization would be legally difficult. The government could prosecute individual actors under criminal or, where the statutory requirements are met, terrorism-related laws. Linking those actors to an organized national or international conspiracy is much harder.

The United States would be better served by investigating the infrastructure behind otherwise loosely connected individuals and networks. It should identify concrete funding mechanisms, operational coordination, foreign direction, planned acts, and command structures where they actually exist.

That would provide a stronger basis for an international coalition aimed at disrupting organized violence or foreign-backed destabilization. Without that work, the initiative could become similar to attempts to treat the Muslim Brotherhood as one centrally controlled organization everywhere in the world.

It is not that extremism does not exist within Muslim Brotherhood-associated circles. The problem is that the movement varies considerably across countries, organizations, and historical periods. For structural, ideological, and deliberate reasons, some networks make themselves difficult to define in conventional legal terms and difficult to pursue systematically.

The same problem arises when a movement has no clear membership, central leadership, or unified mission statement. Participants can say, “We are not part of any particular organization. We simply share certain ideological beliefs.”

A democratic state cannot ordinarily outlaw an ideology by itself. It can prohibit an organization when the legal requirements are met. It can prosecute conspiracy, violence, material support, arson, assault, or terrorism. However, it cannot criminalize an idea merely because that idea is radical or objectionable.

That is where I think the United States falls far short.

The other problem is that, if the administration focuses solely on far-left extremism while pretending that far-right extremism does not exist, it will not be conducting a serious counterterrorism policy.

There is also a broader category of nihilistic, misogynistic, accelerationist, and ideologically mixed extremism that has become more visible during the past decade. Some perpetrators borrow from both the extreme left and the extreme right without fitting neatly into either category.

Certain mass shooters and would-be mass shooters have displayed these mixed, unstable, or incoherent ideological profiles. If the government ignores such cases because they do not fit its preferred political narrative, then it is not seriously confronting terrorism or extremist violence, whatever terminology it chooses to use.

This proposed coalition also does not appear to have a clearly articulated method. Are governments expected simply to label anyone who loosely fits a definition of far-left extremism as a terrorist and imprison that person? Are they expected to pursue funding networks? Are they going to identify concrete conspiracies, planned attacks, and organized violent events?

It is not clear where this partnership is going, what participating governments will be required to do, what happens when they decline to cooperate, or how disagreements over legal definitions and methods will be resolved.

Having more than 60 participating countries creates strong optics. It communicates that many governments are concerned about political violence. However, it does not necessarily translate into a serious, cohesive effort to dismantle the structures that make terrorism or organized extremist violence possible.

Once again, the Trump administration appears more focused on messaging, optics, and the appearance of building a coalition than on the hard and often tedious work of documentation, investigation, intelligence-sharing, evidentiary standards, and exchanging effective practices with other countries.

To me, this looks like a public-relations-centred initiative that falls far short of what would be required for a serious international campaign. I am concerned that it will become even less coherent over time.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer and Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 2,000 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic, media, and research institution fellowships, and currently serves on numerous international boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.