Ernst Raxarov on Swiss Neutrality, Ukraine, Sanctions, and Russian Propaganda

Ernst Raxarov, also known as Oleksandr “Sasha” Volkov, is a Ukrainian-Swiss advocate from Sloviansk in Ukraine’s Donetsk region. Trained in economics, computer science, and German, he moved to Switzerland through a scholarship and became active in the Ukrainian Society of Switzerland. Since Russia’s war began in 2014, he has organized Swiss rallies, lobbied politicians, challenged Kremlin propaganda, and privately delivered civilian vehicles to support Ukraine’s defence within Swiss law, while defending modern, law-based neutrality principles.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Ernst Raxarov examine Swiss neutrality after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Raxarov contrasts orthodox neutrality with a modern view rooted in the UN Charter, arguing Switzerland must distinguish aggressor from victim while remaining outside military alliances. They discuss sanctions, air defence, EU cooperation, propaganda, false balance in journalism, and why Ukrainian diaspora advocacy in Switzerland has become both political work and personal survival under wartime pressure and moral responsibility.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: We will start today with a short story. There was an American journalist named H.L. Mencken, who was especially prominent in the 1920s. He became widely associated with the 1925 Scopes “Monkey Trial.” Mencken used the phrase mockingly, turning the creationists’ own argument back on them with satire.

They were taking a stand, based on biblical literalism and religious mythology, against evolution by natural selection. Mencken inverted the intended argument for humour. He wrote a number of articles covering the trial, often ridiculing those defending biblical creationism. But that is not how scientific truth is decided.

Even today, in some intelligent design and creationist circles, people have argued since the 1990s, including through legal battles in the United States and elsewhere, that schools should “teach the controversy,” meaning teach both sides. That is not how scientific truth emerges. Scientific claims have to go through evidence, experimentation, peer review, and assessment by qualified, credentialed, relevant experts. Over time, these experts may arrive at a broad consensus.

A similar case would be anthropogenic, or human-induced, climate change. People who reject the basic reality of human-caused climate change are called deniers rather than skeptics for a reason. One can be skeptical about the margins of future projections, but to say it is not happening, or to deny the overall trajectory, is denial.

To put evolutionary biologists and creationist biblical scholars on the same platform can legitimize the latter and delegitimize the former by creating a false equivalence. The same problem can appear in journalism. For example, one might invite an expert on Napoleonic history in relation to Swiss neutrality, and then present, as the “other side,” a neo-Nazi Hitler admirer with a YouTube channel and no credentials. That is false balance. Certainly, when it comes to opinion, taste, and aesthetics, there are many legitimate perspectives. But that is not the same as a matter of fact.

So I am giving several cases of how this plays out, where the underlying logic is the same, even though the manifestation differs across professional fields. With regard to Swiss neutrality, which is famous even in Canada, how has it evolved? How has it developed? Where does it make sense, and where does it become absurdist comedy?

Raxarov: In Switzerland today, two schools of thought are competing with each other. They represent two approaches to defining Swiss neutrality.

The first is a more orthodox approach. It takes neutrality literally, as it was described in the old documents, especially in connection with the 1815 Congress of Vienna and later codified in the Hague Conventions of 1907.

That understanding of neutrality was defined in an earlier period, when war was still treated as a regular instrument of state policy. War had not yet been broadly outlawed in international law in the modern sense. According to the Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz, war is the continuation of policy by other means. That was the logic of the era.

During that time, it was considered legal to wage war, including aggressive war. In that situation, Switzerland was obliged not to become involved and to maintain neutrality.

The basic rule was this: if Switzerland supplied one side in a war, it had to supply the other side in equal measure. Otherwise, it had to refuse to supply both sides. If Switzerland refused something to one side, it had to refuse the same thing to the other side. That is the orthodox view of neutrality.

Then there is the modern view of neutrality, especially since Switzerland, after some difficulty, became a member of the United Nations in 2002. Switzerland signed the UN Charter, which prohibits aggression and the use of force to change borders. If one takes this more recent legal framework seriously, including the documents Switzerland has signed, then one has to differentiate between the aggressor and the victim.

That is the second camp in the argument. In the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Switzerland cannot be impartial in the same way. It cannot be neutral between aggression and self-defence. The form of neutrality that applies is that Switzerland does not become directly involved militarily. Otherwise, Switzerland has to stand on the side of international law and support the victim.

Switzerland will have a referendum on this topic in 2026. A heated debate will certainly precede that referendum. The outcome is unclear. Personally, I intend to vote against the orthodox formulation of neutrality. The referendum concerns whether that orthodox definition of neutrality should be written into the Federal Constitution.

Although Swiss neutrality, as you mentioned, is famous around the world, it is not strictly defined in the Constitution in this way. So far, Switzerland has been able to avoid a strict constitutional definition of its neutrality, preserving flexibility to interpret it according to the broader international situation and the circumstances of particular conflicts.

Opponents of the initiative argue that Switzerland should retain that flexibility. Some also point to technological changes.

There is another aspect of Swiss neutrality that is probably less well known. Even in the older nineteenth-century understanding, Swiss neutrality was defined as armed neutrality. Switzerland is obliged to defend itself. It has to defend its own territory. Switzerland is not allowed to let foreign troops pass through its territory, even if those troops are not fighting on Swiss soil.

For example, if Russian troops wanted to attack France and pass through Switzerland from Austria to France, Switzerland would be obliged to prevent that passage. It would have to resist.

Jacobsen: If those troops took a route five kilometres around the Swiss border, Switzerland would be obliged not to attack?

Raxarov: Yes. Switzerland’s obligation begins when its sovereign territory is breached. As soon as that happens, Switzerland is obliged to defend itself.

Of course, in the nineteenth century, this was mostly about land. Today, it is also about airspace. By the same logic, Switzerland is obliged to defend its airspace. If something were to pass through Swiss airspace, such as ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or attack drones, Switzerland would be obliged to shoot them down.

Switzerland would have to shoot them down. That means Switzerland needs an air-defence system and the wider military capability to fulfil that obligation. At the moment, we have a problem: Switzerland may not be in a position to do so adequately. The Swiss military has weakened in relative terms over the past 30 years, quite markedly, especially in air defence.

Jacobsen: What if a jet or missile were travelling from the south or the north—for example, from Italy northward, or from the northwest toward Italy through Swiss airspace—but it was actually on a trajectory away from Switzerland and had malfunctioned? Or what if it had been redirected outside the control of the operator or the computer system, and then landed in Swiss territory or passed through Swiss territory? Would Switzerland be obliged to shoot it down? Would that be considered an act of war?

Raxarov: Those are two different questions. The first question is whether Switzerland would be obliged to shoot it down. Yes, it would.

The second question is whether that would be considered an act of war. That depends on the circumstances. For example, during the Russia-Ukraine war, drones or missile debris have crossed into or landed in neighbouring or nearby European states. Those incidents have not automatically been treated as acts of war. If it is genuinely accidental or caused by malfunction, that is a different matter.

But there is another point. Swiss territory contains infrastructure that is vital not only for Switzerland but for Europe as a whole. That is an additional argument for Switzerland having to shoot down anything that enters its airspace, regardless of whether it does so intentionally, unintentionally, or while aimed at another country. Switzerland has to be able to respond to anything coming its way.

At present, Switzerland is outside all military alliances. Therefore, Switzerland has to be able to do this on its own.

Jacobsen: Is Switzerland allowed to purchase weapons or defence systems from those alliances while still remaining outside them?

Raxarov: Yes, of course. Switzerland is allowed to do that, and it does so. Switzerland buys many weapons systems from the United States, for example. The fighter jets currently in service include the F/A-18C/D Hornet, and Switzerland has ordered F-35A aircraft. Switzerland also ordered Patriot air-defence systems from the United States.

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The problem is that Switzerland is, in a sense, not a priority. For example, the United States delayed the delivery of Patriot systems that Switzerland had ordered because it prioritized deliveries to Ukraine. As a result, the Swiss order was postponed.

Jacobsen: So, you feel a little Canadian?

Raxarov: Even more so, probably.

Switzerland does cooperate militarily with other countries, but this is gradually becoming a point of contention. If you are outside any alliance, other countries may still cooperate with you, but you are often at the end of the line. You are less important strategically. That means your deliveries may be delayed, sometimes overpriced, or in some cases not delivered at all.

These are difficult questions for Switzerland to answer. They are also tearing the country apart to some extent. Some people genuinely believe in the orthodox form of neutrality. Others present themselves as realists and say: look, given modern military technology, Switzerland cannot defend itself alone. It has to cooperate at least with Europe.

There have even been voices calling for NATO membership, though they are not especially prominent. More commonly, there is debate about security cooperation agreements with the European Union. But for people opposed to closer cooperation with the European Union, even that is taboo.

Jacobsen: My final comment before we close this interview is that anti-European Union voices in Switzerland are also quite strong. That is normal within a democratic system. Internal debate is healthy in democracies. It is a good thing, not a bad thing.

Raxarov: Swiss neutrality is a difficult topic.

Jacobsen: Very difficult. I was giving some North American analogies. In journalism, for example, there is a problem with “both-sides” framing. If you put a creationist on the same platform as an evolutionary biologist, it can look like comedy. We were talking about the history of Swiss neutrality from the nineteenth century onward.

Raxarov: The more potent parallel is actually Russian propaganda. That could be the second interview. That is where we see stronger examples of this problem. It is something the Ukrainian Society of Switzerland has struggled with. The society dates back to 1945, when Ukrainians who found themselves in Switzerland after the Second World War began organizing.

Jacobsen: Europeans have a habit of fleeing regimes.

Raxarov: Yes. In my experience, since Russia’s war against Ukraine began in 2014, especially in the first years, many journalists practiced this kind of equidistance. They would present it as: on one side, Ukrainians say they are defending their land; on the other side, Russians say Ukraine is murdering Russian-speaking babies. They presented these as equally credible claims.

Jacobsen: So: Ukrainians are murdering Russian-speaking babies, and Ukraine is led by a Jewish neo-Nazi.

Raxarov: At that time, Ukraine had a different president, but yes, the pattern was similar. It was terrible for us because what they were producing was a half-lie.

Jacobsen: A half-lie is often more difficult to fight. It is harder to fabricate, but also harder to combat.

Raxarov: Exactly. Journalists who publish that can always say there is some proof in it.

Jacobsen: In my entire career, I have never been targeted so aggressively as when I said I was going to Ukraine. People asked: “Why are you going to Ukraine? Who are you going to see? I just want to make sure you are seeing other sources.” But this often functions like the creationist example. They provide only critical voices and critiques of evolution, but they do not propose a credible alternative. Then one realizes what the alternative actually is. It is a similar pattern.

To conclude the first interview: Swiss society has an internal debate over neutrality. That is normal. It is healthy in democracies.

Do you have any final thoughts before we close?

Raxarov: For me, this manifests itself in the debate over sanctions against Russia in connection with the war in Ukraine. In the first days of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the Swiss government was under extreme pressure from the public to do something against the aggressor. It eventually adopted EU sanctions against Russia.

I spoke at a rally in Bern with more than 10,000 people, which is a large demonstration by Swiss standards. After that, the government yielded and said that, exceptionally, for the first time in our history, Switzerland would introduce sanctions against the aggressor country. It would implement the European Union’s sanctions in Switzerland as well.

Before the full-scale invasion, the European Union already had sanctions against Russia, but Switzerland had not joined them. Switzerland had tried only to prevent the circumvention of European sanctions through Swiss territory or Swiss institutions. That was all it tried to do.

This time, Switzerland said: we will fully implement the European Union’s sanctions. But to balance that decision against the orthodox view of neutrality, the Swiss government issued a decree. For example, if certain dual-use goods were prohibited from being delivered to Russia, the same dual-use goods would not be delivered to Ukraine either.

So there was one decree by which Switzerland joined the European Union’s sanctions, and then there was a second measure that effectively said: for balance, because there is a war, we are also temporarily restricting certain exports to Ukraine. The aim was to prevent, for example, dual-use goods from being delivered to Ukraine.

That was a temporary ruling. The problem in Switzerland is that temporary measures cannot remain temporary forever. It has now been four years, so the government was obliged to put the measure into law. It produced a draft law, which is now being debated in Parliament.

Of course, the media called it sanctions against Ukraine. Now we have to fight that in Parliament. We are lobbying the parliamentary parties. We are telling them: derail this law.

We do not know what will happen to the temporary decree if the law is stopped. It may be prolonged and remain in place. But for us, it is at least necessary to torpedo this law and prevent restrictions against Ukraine from being written into law. If that happens, it will become much more difficult to reverse.

Jacobsen: That is an instrument, of course. In Switzerland, there are instruments of direct democracy.Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Ernst.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 1,900 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.