Everywhere Insiders 59: Mamdani, Netanyahu, ICC Warrants, and Morocco’s Lawyers’ Strike

Irina Tsukerman is a New York-registered human rights and national security lawyer, geopolitical analyst, and journalist. She earned a B.A. in International/Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006 and a J.D. from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She is president of Scarab Rising, Inc., editor-in-chief of The Washington Outsider, and fellow of the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs and the Arabian Peninsula Institute. Her work focuses on foreign policy, information warfare, security, and Middle Eastern affairs. She serves as Written Content Vice Chair of the American Bar Association’s Science and Technology Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman examine New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani’s call for federal enforcement of the ICC warrant against Benjamin Netanyahu, distinguishing accusation from conviction and municipal rhetoric from federal authority. They then analyze Morocco’s Draft Law No. 66.23, nationwide lawyers’ strikes, judicial independence, bar autonomy, and international solidarity. Tsukerman connects both disputes through concerns about legal precision, politicization, due process, and institutional safeguards across democratic and constitutional systems.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Welcome back to Everywhere Insiders with the one and only Irina Tsukerman, Washington Outsider’s editor-in-chief and one of my millions of bosses around the world. I wanted to focus on some very substantial news. I know we are a little bit late to this round, given travel and some other things. A lot has happened. It is July 27, 2026. With the delays, it is even more remarkable that some of these developments have continued unfolding. I wanted to get your expert take on this because you wrote a very interesting and non-standard but well-informed analysis of many of these issues. I have a lot of experience as a journalist conducting interviews, but I deal with experts. My knowledge base is distributed among them and updated over time. This is going to be interesting.

On July 22, the Associated Press reported that New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani stated that the city could not arrest Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu but that the federal government should do so.

To be very clear, the warrants are from the ICC, the International Criminal Court, not the ICJ, the International Court of Justice. For clarification, the ICJ hears legal disputes between states and provides advisory opinions on questions of international law. The ICC prosecutes individuals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, or the crime of aggression.

With regard to Mr. Netanyahu and former Israeli defence minister Yoav Gallant, the ICC issued arrest warrants concerning allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity. However, an arrest warrant does not mean that there has been a trial or conviction. ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I determined that there were reasonable grounds to believe that Netanyahu and Gallant bore criminal responsibility for the alleged offences. That remains distinct from a conviction following trial.

Therefore, to say that you would like to arrest someone, or that the federal government should do so, arguably reveals one’s biases, to put it lightly, regarding this particular individual.

What is your preliminary take on this first statement from the broader speech by the New York City mayor?

Irina Tsukerman: There are three major issues with this. The first is jurisdiction. The United States has never been a state party to the Rome Statute, which established the ICC, and is not obligated under that treaty to execute ICC arrest warrants. The U.S. government is therefore unlikely to arrest anybody on the basis of these warrants. That is the first issue. Mr. Mamdani ought to know better than to make statements that are legally misleading and that mislead his audience about what the federal government will, can, or should do regarding the extraterritorial application of law.

The second issue is that, as you correctly pointed out, the ICC has not issued a judgment convicting Netanyahu. Therefore, describing Netanyahu as a convicted war criminal would be factually incorrect. Referring to him simply as a war criminal, rather than as a person accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity, presents the allegation as an established fact. Whether such a statement would be legally defamatory in the United States is a separate and much more difficult question. The applicable legal standard is considerably harder to meet in the United States than in many other jurisdictions. Nevertheless, as I was saying, this is arguably a statement with the potential to incite hostility.

People are free to hold opinions. They can evaluate Netanyahu’s decisions, provided that they present evidence supporting their conclusions.

I suspect that Mr. Mamdani does not believe himself bound by an evidentiary standard because he has yet to cite a specific basis for his conclusion that Netanyahu is a war criminal.

The ICC is not necessarily an infallible judge of who should or should not be arrested. For instance, ICC Chief Prosecutor Karim Khan, who applied for the warrants, was removed from office following sexual-misconduct allegations, which he denies. Khan was the prosecutor, not one of the judges who authorized the warrants. His removal does not automatically invalidate either the case or the arrest warrants, which were issued independently by ICC Pre-Trial Chamber I.

There have also been reports of a Qatar-linked intelligence operation targeting Khan’s accuser. That is different from substantiated evidence that Qatar bribed Khan in the Netanyahu case. Khan is a British lawyer of Pakistani heritage, not a Pakistani judge.

I do not know whether these circumstances will affect the case itself or the arrest warrants, but the circumstances surrounding the proceedings have raised serious questions.

There is a substantial evidentiary threshold for establishing war crimes. There is also a significant difference between alleging individual abuses by soldiers or commanders, identifying horrific or unethical statements by Israeli government officials who might warrant dismissal or internal investigation, and establishing that state leaders planned or directed conduct constituting war crimes or crimes against humanity.

The ICC judges nevertheless found reasonable grounds to believe that Benjamin Netanyahu and Yoav Gallant bore criminal responsibility for alleged crimes, including the war crime of starvation as a method of warfare and the crimes against humanity of murder, persecution, and other inhumane acts. That finding is sufficient for an arrest warrant but is not equivalent to proof beyond a reasonable doubt or a criminal conviction.

I have not seen evidence that Netanyahu directly ordered the military to disregard international humanitarian law. The ICC’s theory of responsibility, however, does not depend solely on evidence of an explicit order. The Court has alleged responsibility based on the officials’ authority, conduct, and alleged contribution to policies affecting the civilian population. These allegations remain untested at trial.

One issue raised by some observers concerns Itamar Ben-Gvir, particularly statements appearing to endorse harsh treatment of Palestinian detainees and reports alleging torture or abuse in Israeli detention facilities. Such conduct, when connected to an armed conflict and satisfying the required legal elements, can constitute a war crime.

The fact that detainees are not members of a conventional state military does not remove them from the protection of international humanitarian law. Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions protects people who are not actively participating in hostilities, including conflict-related detainees, against torture, cruel treatment, and humiliating or degrading treatment. The Rome Statute also recognizes torture and cruel treatment as potential war crimes in both international and non-international armed conflicts.

Hamas is designated as a terrorist organization by several governments and is not the regular armed force of a recognized state. That classification does not permit torture. International humanitarian law applies to organized armed groups and state forces in qualifying armed conflicts, while international human rights law and domestic criminal law may provide further protections against torture.

Jacobsen: Selected statements quoted in the NPR and Associated Press report came from a video posted on X: “It is clear that we do not have the independent legal authority to enforce this warrant. The federal government, however, does, and I call on them to join the ICC and execute this warrant.” Mamdani also described the Israeli prime minister as a “war criminal.”

President Donald Trump stated on social media, “He will not be arrested, in any way, shape, or form, while in the United States of America.”

In terms of what you are saying, and my knowledge of jurisdiction and the standards governing states party to the Rome Statute, we are not dealing with a body possessing universal jurisdiction over every country.

It is a nuanced topic and a different area of concern. We are dealing with the correct court, the ICC. Mamdani had the general framework right but the legal details wrong. This is where the work of the United Nations becomes relevant because its officials may provide commentary on the matter.

The key issue is that I disagree with President Trump’s categorical position that Netanyahu will not be arrested, but I understand the legal basis for declining to execute the warrant. The United States is not a party to the Rome Statute and has no general treaty obligation to enforce ICC arrest warrants. An arrest warrant also initiates proceedings. It does not establish guilt or justify assuming that the accused is already a war criminal.

Surprisingly, I am more aligned with President Trump than with Mayor Mamdani regarding the ICC, the standards governing Pre-Trial Chamber arrest warrants, and the United States’ status outside the Rome Statute. I doubt that Trump has a nuanced understanding of the ICC, the Rome Statute, or the Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, his practical position is closer to the legal reality in this case than Mamdani’s.

In essence, this is a performance. It is highly theatrical.

Tsukerman: Interestingly, Mamdani’s focus is exclusively on Netanyahu. He has not shown comparable interest in Vladimir Putin, who is also subject to an ICC arrest warrant. The ICC issued its warrant for Putin in March 2023 over the alleged unlawful deportation and transfer of Ukrainian children.

I do not recall Mamdani making comparable statements about arresting Putin on American soil when Putin met Trump in Alaska in August 2025. This apparent inconsistency suggests a double standard. Similar scrutiny could also be applied to officials from Pakistan and other countries who have faced allegations of war crimes or crimes against humanity.

Netanyahu is being singled out from among numerous world leaders and officials accused of international crimes. He alone appears to receive this level of attention from Mamdani as he prepares to travel to the United States to meet President Trump and discuss matters related to Iran.

I find that curious. If Mayor Mamdani wishes to turn New York City into a centre for international law, in addition to governing a municipality constrained by federal and state law, should he not extend his foreign-policy commentary to other countries and cases rather than concentrating on one issue?

His family may also have influenced his political outlook, judging from public statements by his parents, particularly his father.

His father, Mahmood Mamdani, is a prominent Columbia University scholar whose work focuses on colonialism, anti-colonialism, political violence, and decolonisation. It would not be accurate to describe him as a Stalinist without specific supporting evidence. His scholarship is often situated within Marxist, postcolonial, and anti-imperialist intellectual traditions, but those categories are not interchangeable with Stalinism.

People frequently accuse Zohran Mamdani of being an Islamist. I have seen little evidence that his politics are driven primarily by religious doctrine. His public identity and policies are more accurately described as democratic socialist and strongly influenced by progressive activist movements.

I have, however, observed rhetoric from both him and his father that reflects a rigid ideological framework. That influence may also appear in Mamdani’s public statements and writing.

I agree that the people around him emerge from an intellectual ecosystem shaped by similarly oriented faculty members, a partly self-selecting student body, and academic materials that influence the discourse within those institutions.

When someone is raised in a politically homogeneous environment in which competing interpretations are not explored in depth, and then enters an academic setting in which similar assumptions are repeatedly reinforced, the outcome can become predictable. If students are not taught to question dominant premises, authorities, and their own political communities, but instead are encouraged to embrace them, ideological conformity can follow.

Jacobsen: Returning to the main point, another statement may be relevant. Mamdani said, “I want to be equally clear: Benjamin Netanyahu is not welcome in New York City, nor is any other war criminal at large.”

An ICC arrest warrant does not make someone a convicted war criminal. Netanyahu is an accused person subject to an outstanding arrest warrant. The warrant reflects a judicial finding that reasonable grounds exist to believe he bears responsibility for alleged crimes. It is not a final judgment following trial.

The phrase “war criminal at large” commonly implies that criminal responsibility has already been established and that a convicted offender is evading capture. That is not Netanyahu’s legal status before the ICC. The arrest warrant is significant and should not be minimized, but guilt has not been determined at trial.

Mamdani’s wording therefore presumes guilt before conviction. It reverses the proper order of criminal proceedings.

Tsukerman: There is a historical comparison involving former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani and Palestine Liberation Organization chairman Yasser Arafat.

In October 1995, Arafat travelled to New York for events marking the United Nations’ fiftieth anniversary. He attended a city-sponsored concert at Lincoln Center, where Giuliani ordered that he be removed. Arafat had been admitted to the United States for United Nations-related activities, but the concert was a municipal event outside UN headquarters. Giuliani’s action drew criticism from the Clinton administration and the State Department.

Arafat did not wave a gun during that 1995 concert. The firearm reference comes from his well-known 1974 address to the UN General Assembly, during which he said that he carried an olive branch and a “freedom fighter’s gun.” Contemporary accounts reported that he wore an empty holster rather than brandishing a weapon inside the chamber.

The Giuliani episode illustrates that a mayor may exclude or remove someone from a city-controlled ceremonial event under certain circumstances. It does not establish that a mayor possesses authority to execute an ICC arrest warrant or override federal control of foreign relations, immigration, diplomatic immunity, or international obligations.

Technically, did Giuliani have the authority to remove Arafat, given that Arafat had entered the United States on a federal visa connected to the United Nations anniversary events? The answer is debatable, but Lincoln Center was not international territory. It was a city-controlled venue in New York, not part of the United Nations headquarters complex. Arafat reportedly possessed a ticket to the concert, and the State Department criticized Giuliani’s decision to have him removed.

Arafat was not the head of a universally recognized sovereign state at the time. He was chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization and president of the newly established Palestinian Authority. However, there is no reliable evidence that he brought weapons into the Lincoln Center event or threatened anyone there. That claim should not be included without supporting evidence.

I doubt that Netanyahu intends to threaten anyone while visiting New York. Another difference is that Netanyahu is the sitting prime minister of a recognized state. Arafat was the leader of the PLO, an organization with a history of terrorism, although by 1995 he had also signed the Oslo Accords, led the Palestinian Authority, and shared the 1994 Nobel Peace Prize.

Jacobsen: Certainly. We have spent considerable time on this subject. How are we doing for time? We could cover the Putin material later because there will probably be follow-up reporting. Let us move to the Morocco issue. That is the larger topic.

The New York City Bar Association has expressed support for Moroccan lawyers opposing Draft Law No. 66.23. The association argues that the proposed legislation could undermine the independence of lawyers and the autonomy of Morocco’s bar associations.

This story has received little attention in major Western media. It may not appear immediately relevant to an American audience, but the involvement of the New York City Bar Association gives it broader significance for the international legal profession.

Lawyers across Morocco organized strikes and protests against Draft Law No. 66.23. Among their objections is a provision that would give courts direct disciplinary authority over lawyers, a function traditionally exercised by bar associations. They argue that this would compromise the profession’s institutional independence.

The government temporarily suspended the bill’s advancement and entered discussions with representatives of the legal profession. The initial nationwide strike began in January 2026 and caused widespread adjournments and delays in Moroccan courts. Lawyers later ended that phase of the strike after the government suspended the proposed reform and opened negotiations.

International legal organizations, including the New York City Bar Association, have continued to monitor the dispute because it concerns judicial independence, professional self-governance, due-process protections, and the rights of defendants.

What is happening with Draft Law No. 66.23, and why is the New York City Bar Association involved in a dispute taking place in Morocco?

Tsukerman: This controversy has continued for months. The lawyers’ strikes have substantially disrupted court proceedings across Morocco. When a nationwide dispute within the legal profession causes extensive delays throughout a country’s justice system, it becomes internationally newsworthy.

The New York City Bar Association frequently comments on international rule-of-law issues through its committees and reports. Its involvement does not mean that it possesses jurisdiction in Morocco. It is acting as a professional association concerned with the independence of lawyers and the administration of justice.

The political structure must also be described accurately. Morocco is a constitutional monarchy. The king is the head of state and retains extensive constitutional, political, religious, and security powers. The government, headed by the prime minister, is institutionally distinct, but it is not wholly separate from the monarchy or the king’s authority. Treating the king and the government as entirely disconnected entities would therefore be misleading.

The current government is elected and may lose the next parliamentary elections. It is a coalition of several parties, some of which could move into opposition. One interpretation is that the proposed bill, which would increase state influence over lawyers and bar associations, could enable political actors to gain leverage within future institutional power struggles. That remains a political interpretation rather than an established motive behind the legislation.

Prime Minister Aziz Akhannouch intervened during an earlier stage of the dispute, and the government temporarily suspended the bill and opened negotiations. The legislation was later reintroduced and approved by Parliament in amended form. It was subsequently referred to Morocco’s Constitutional Court for review.

Justice Minister Abdellatif Ouahbi also made forceful public statements during the dispute. Lawyers interpreted some of his remarks as threatening consequences if they continued to oppose the legislation. The precise language and context should be quoted directly before characterizing the remarks as a formal threat.

Morocco has an Association of Bar Associations that broadly represents the country’s local bars. It is somewhat comparable to a national professional federation, although it is not institutionally identical to the American Bar Association.

Morocco’s legal system belongs primarily to the civil-law tradition and has been strongly influenced by French law. The United States, by contrast, predominantly follows the common-law tradition inherited from England, although Louisiana retains a mixed system with substantial civil-law roots.

The professional role of lawyers is broadly comparable across these systems. Moroccan bar associations exercise professional and regulatory responsibilities, including setting ethical standards, overseeing aspects of professional discipline, supporting practitioners, and defending the institutional independence of the legal profession.

Lawyers argue that Bill No. 66.23 would restrict the autonomy of bar associations, expand judicial or governmental influence over professional discipline, and constrain lawyers’ ability to represent clients independently. Critics say those provisions could weaken fair-trial protections and the right to an effective defence.

These concerns prompted nationwide strikes, boycotts of court proceedings, sit-ins, and large demonstrations, including protests outside Parliament in Rabat. The work stoppages caused extensive adjournments and delays in criminal and civil proceedings.

The dispute has so far remained largely peaceful. It would not be accurate, however, to say that the government never engaged in dialogue or suspended the bill. The government paused the legislation and opened negotiations in February 2026, after which lawyers ended that phase of their strike. The bill was later revived, passed by Parliament, and referred to the Constitutional Court, leading lawyers to renew their protest activity.

The government has therefore not abandoned the legislation, despite sustained opposition from the legal profession.

Why are external organizations becoming involved? The New York City Bar Association was not the first foreign legal organization to express support. French lawyers and professional bodies also voiced concern about the proposed reforms.

Jacobsen: That French involvement makes historical and institutional sense.

Tsukerman: Yes. Morocco’s legal system was heavily influenced by France during the protectorate period, and professional relationships between Moroccan and French lawyers remain substantial. Foreign bar associations have no jurisdiction over Moroccan law, but they may issue statements when proposed legislation raises concerns about judicial independence, professional autonomy, due process, or access to legal representation.

The New York City Bar Association’s intervention is therefore an act of professional solidarity and international rule-of-law advocacy, not an attempt to exercise authority within Morocco. Its statement specifically supports the independence of Moroccan lawyers and bar associations amid the controversy surrounding Bill No. 66.23.

Once this issue became international, concern grew that state interference with the independence of the legal profession could establish a dangerous precedent. If such control becomes accepted in one country, similar measures may be attempted elsewhere.

In the United States, critics have already raised concerns about the Trump administration’s handling of the Department of Justice and its treatment of major law firms. The administration issued executive orders targeting several firms over their previous legal work, political associations, and diversity policies. Some firms challenged the orders successfully in court, while others reached agreements with the White House.

Several firms pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in pro bono legal services for causes mutually agreed upon with the administration. It would be inaccurate to say that they were required to contribute “three hours.” Nine firms collectively pledged approximately $940 million in free legal work. Critics argued that these agreements created professional conflicts and could influence which clients or cases the firms were willing to accept. The firms maintained that they retained control over their representations.

There have also been disputes concerning diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives within the legal profession, including pressure on law firms and criticism of the American Bar Association. The ABA has publicly opposed efforts that it considers threats to the independence of lawyers, courts, and the legal profession.

The United States has not reached the same stage of direct state control over bar associations alleged by Moroccan lawyers. Nevertheless, these developments have produced tensions between federal authorities and parts of the legal profession, creating uncomfortable parallels.

That helps explain why the New York City Bar Association is speaking out. Allowing state interference with the independence of lawyers to become normalized anywhere can threaten justice elsewhere. To adapt Martin Luther King Jr.’s observation, injustice in one place can endanger justice in another. In this context, the danger extends not only to individual outcomes but also to the institutions responsible for administering justice.

The New York City Bar Association’s statement expressed respect for Morocco’s sovereignty and domestic affairs. It did not claim jurisdiction or call for foreign intervention. Instead, it urged the Moroccan authorities, including the minister of justice, to pursue a respectful resolution through meaningful dialogue with the legal profession.

There is no sound reason to reform an entire profession without substantial input from the people who practise within it. Lawyers are particularly well positioned to explain how proposed rules would affect their ethical duties, their ability to represent clients, and the functioning of the justice system.

The consequences would not be limited to private defence lawyers. Prosecutors and other government lawyers could also be affected by changes to professional independence, disciplinary authority, and legal procedure. These are serious institutional questions.

I do not expect statements from foreign bar associations to change the legislation directly. At minimum, however, they signal that international legal organizations are watching the dispute and taking the concerns of their Moroccan colleagues seriously.

This represents professional solidarity on a scale that should not have become necessary. In my opinion, the matter became an international issue because the Moroccan government mishandled the dispute.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer and Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 2,000 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic, media, and research institution fellowships, and currently serves on numerous international boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.