Russian Orthodox 'Holy War' Framing and Propaganda in Ukraine: Interview With Alex Craiu

Alex Craiu is a Romanian war correspondent based in Ukraine, reporting from the frontline and rear areas for international audiences. Trained in documentary and cinematography production, he studied in the United Kingdom and in California, United States. He works as an independent, freelance journalist and has produced short-form video reporting for social platforms as well as written analysis. In 2017, he completed an internship with the BBC in London, then expanded his field reporting during Russia’s full-scale invasion. Craiu has contributed to outlets including Veridica and In-Sight Publishing, focusing on civilian life, information warfare, battlefield realities, and humanitarian consequences under fire.

In this exchange, Scott Douglas Jacobsen asks Alex Craiu how religion is mobilized in Russia’s war against Ukraine. Craiu explains that Orthodox rhetoric can sacralize the conflict as a “holy war,” linking state survival to morality, tradition, and anti-LGBT messaging, while also functioning as routine political language. He notes spillover inside Ukraine, including wartime allegations involving clergy, and describes efforts to distance Ukrainian Orthodoxy from Moscow and consolidate the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. Craiu highlights propaganda in Chernivtsi exploiting Romanian ethnicity and church legitimacy, and he observes that churches are usually damaged amid broader strikes, not uniquely targeted across rural communities.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: How are religious discourse, iconography, and language used to justify continuing the aggression—or stopping it, if at all—among the various players in this war?

Alex Craiu: The Russian Orthodox Church, in some framings, presents the conflict as a holy war and as part of a state-shaping narrative. In other contexts, it functions as part of ordinary political discourse. Because Russia is at war or adjacent to a country at war, religious language is elevated, though it is not always used as direct justification. There are different frames and nuances surrounding this. In an ideal world, the church would be separated from the state and its political narratives.

Jacobsen: In the best of all possible worlds, God would have no role in the state?

Craiu: Or in its representatives. That would occur in an ideal world. We are not in such a world. In Russia, the war is often framed in sacral terms, including as a “holy war,” and justified as a defence of national existence. Cultural elements tied to religion are portrayed as values that Russia is protecting.

These include morality as expressed through Orthodoxy, “family values,” and tradition—principles that, according to the Russian narrative, Ukraine has abandoned. Russia’s anti-LGBT posture is frequently positioned in that narrative as evidence of a moral contrast, and Ukraine’s steps toward recognizing LGBT rights are cited as proof of divergence. This perceived distance from Orthodox values is used to reinforce the claim that Russia is waging a holy war.

Clerical rhetoric has also been used to justify violence, and the religious framing has had spillover effects inside Ukraine as well. For example, Ukrainian authorities reported serving a notice of suspicion to Metropolitan Arseniy, the head (abbot) of the Sviatohirsk Lavra in Donetsk Oblast, alleging he leaked the locations of Ukrainian defence checkpoints in the Kramatorsk district. This offence can carry a prison sentence if proven in court.

I am referring to a priest who was accused of espionage and of collaborating with Russian forces. This occurred in Donetsk Oblast, an area that has been strategically significant for Ukraine’s defence. Such allegations, if proven, constitute a serious offence during wartime.

We have seen Russia attempt to retain influence in Ukraine through religious structures. This has also prompted institutional changes within Ukrainian Orthodoxy, particularly efforts to distance certain communities from the traditionally Moscow-affiliated Ukrainian Orthodox Church and to consolidate support for the Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which received autocephaly from the Ecumenical Patriarchate in 2019. These developments have generated mixed reactions and have become targets of Russian propaganda.

One focal point has been Chernivtsi Oblast, which borders Romania. There, Russian narratives have emphasized two issues: ethnicity and religion. Propaganda has promoted the claim that Romanian minorities in the region are being discriminated against by the Ukrainian government, thereby attempting to strain Ukraine–Romania relations. In parallel, the Moscow-affiliated church structures have been portrayed as the sole legitimate representatives of the Romanian community in that region.

This framing has encouraged some to conflate the pro-Moscow church with the protection of Romanian ethnic identity. However, instrumentalizing minority communities for geopolitical messaging is not equivalent to protecting their cultural or national identity. Rather, it advances a particular state narrative.

From this perspective, religious discourse functions as a vehicle for division. On the Russian side, it serves to transmit state propaganda through local messengers, including clergy who wield influence within their communities. While each case may be local, the cumulative effect across multiple rural areas can shape broader public perception.

Jacobsen: Are churches being bombed?

Craiu: Religious buildings have been damaged or destroyed during the war, sometimes as part of broader strikes and sometimes under disputed circumstances. I have not observed evidence that churches are targeted at a significantly higher rate than residential or other civilian structures. In many documented cases, they appear to have been damaged during wider bombardment.

This has affected not only Orthodox churches but also other Christian denominations and religious sites. For example, the Transfiguration Cathedral in Odesa sustained significant damage during a Russian missile strike in July 2023. Religious buildings have been damaged since the early stages of the full-scale invasion, and such incidents continue.

The Russian Federation does not appear to prioritize the preservation of these structures’ religious or historical significance. When such buildings are not of strategic use, they may be damaged in attacks alongside other civilian infrastructure, without regard for their heritage value.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Alex.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 1,800 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.