Everywhere Insiders 50: Tulsi Gabbard Resignation, Iran Talks, and Rising Antisemitism

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen interviews Irina Tsukerman on Tulsi Gabbard’s resignation, Iran negotiations, and rising antisemitic violence in London and Canada, exploring geopolitical strategy, internal divisions within Trump-aligned circles, and concerns over weak enforcement against threats. Tsukerman argues Gabbard’s departure reflects ideological conflict rather than personal reasons, while warning that concessions to Iran could reshape maritime norms and embolden authoritarian actors. The discussion highlights escalating rhetoric, coordination in hate crimes, and the necessity of intelligence measures.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: So, I will start here. For anyone who tunes into our series at some point, regularly or in the future, first of all, thank you.

Second of all, the news released in our conversational analysis, particularly with Irina’s expertise, will always be a little bit later. The follow-up from these reports will come out a little bit later. Our sources for this particular series are always, or mostly, Associated Press and Reuters because they do excellent, high-factuality, prominent short-form news reportage.

There have been a couple of points where I have commented in some of our sessions that there has been a little bit of editorializing in what should be news, but no one is perfect. Computers hallucinate; people editorialize occasionally. That happens.

So the first news I wanted to focus on today, which is right at the top, is that Tulsi Gabbard has resigned as the top U.S. intelligence official. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has noted that there is progress in Iran talks, but says they are not there yet. With a footnote to all of that, many commentators have noted, including yourself, that the imprecision and shifting sands of the goals – asking the question, “What are your targeted objectives?” and not having a clear answer – signals an administration without a clear vision for enacting a war in coordination with Israel.

So what are your thoughts on the resignation of Gabbard, as well as the statements of “not there yet” from Mr. Rubio?

Irina Tsukerman: Regarding Tulsi Gabbard, the officially stated reason is the sudden illness of her husband, who was supposedly diagnosed with rare bone cancer. While I am not skeptical that he may have that illness, I am skeptical that that is actually the reason she resigned.

The reason being a couple of things. First, there have been several high-level resignations by her political allies in the administration, including Joe Kent, who was the head of the National Counterterrorism Center and who was basically pushed into that position by Gabbard and her circle of political insiders within the administration, and Amaryllis Fox Kennedy, who resigned from two senior positions in the administration.

Just a couple of days ago, like Joe Kent, she cited the Iran war as the reason for her resignation. Moreover, Tulsi Gabbard was at odds with the Trump administration over Iran since the very start of her tenure last year. She was reportedly missing from some of the key planning meetings related to Iran. She was also vocal and critical of any confrontational posture by the administration regarding Iran.

Even sanctions and things like that she was critical of. She has been known to be quite close to the Assad regime. She has also been known for being openly pro-Russian and even retweeting outright fabrications by Russian propagandists, such as the claim that the Bucha massacre was not real.

So there is clearly a strong ideological difference between her and some of the war hawks who favor a stronger position on Iran, on Russia, and the entire Kremlin-aligned coalition, I would say.

I do not believe, though, that she was pushed or forced out of the administration. I rather think that, seeing as things are not going their way anyway, she thought it would be a good time, along with that whole group of people.

To leave office and to lead MAGA-plus-Democrat groups who are already anti-Trump on various other issues, including this one, and to put pressure on the remaining Trump figures from the outside, while being seen as far more principled than those who claim to be peacemakers and so forth. So essentially, I think the idea is to tear the MAGA movement apart by leaving office.

And by the way, many of these people are much closer to J. D. Vance than to Donald Trump personally. The reason Tulsi Gabbard was appointed where she was is because she demanded that position, and also the position of Health and Human Services, which was ultimately given to her other ally.

Both of them were ex-Democrats who assisted Trump with his second-term campaign. Tulsi Gabbard was a former presidential candidate, but more interestingly, she and Robert F. Kennedy Jr. are quite close politically. Moreover, they share another connection: both have links to Lyndon LaRouche circles.

So it may not be a coincidence that her two preferred positions included one that her close ally ended up receiving. She effectively secured influence across both areas. Essentially, we are seeing a faction within the MAGA movement that is much closer to a pseudo-isolationist position. We are dealing with a pseudo-isolationist tendency.

None of her actions are consistent with the position of a principled isolationist who believes the United States should stay out of foreign engagements. On the contrary, she appears to favor engagement when it benefits regimes she finds acceptable, for whatever reason.

Moreover, the fact that she was retweeting outright falsehoods about the Bucha massacre is also inconsistent with an isolationist stance that would simply say, “This is none of our concern; let us focus on internal security.” This is someone taking sides with an aggressor in a conflict.

So I find it difficult to believe that someone with a military and political background, who was involved in psyops as a member of the U.S. military, would not be able to distinguish the nuances between genuine isolationism and using it as a pretext to empower authoritarian and aggressive regimes.

So I do not believe the stated reason. I think she is using her husband’s illness as an excuse. The reality is that she and her allies have likely decided this is a good moment to leave, to put more pressure on the administration over the Iran war, and to do so freely while being seen as principled by their ideological followers.

Possibly, the aim is to unite pseudo-isolationist Republicans and Democrats who favor similar positions, and to strengthen a bipartisan bloc of opponents, opposed not because of logistical concerns or because they think the war is being poorly conducted, but because they do not view Iran as an aggressor or as deserving of criticism in a general sense.

Regarding Marco Rubio, it does not seem that he himself is playing a major role in this part of the negotiations. It appears that other actors are on the ground conducting the talks. Beyond Pakistan, Qatar has also sent a negotiating team to Tehran.

Each time that happens in a conflict, the results tend to favor whatever Iran or Qatar are pushing for. We have seen this previously with the Taliban withdrawal agreement, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan under Donald Trump. We have also seen it under various circumstances with the Joe Biden administration, and again with the Trump administration in Gaza Strip and elsewhere. Wherever Qatar has played an active negotiating role, the outcome has tended to favor the non-Western side, or at least reflect concessions that Qatar has pushed for.

Now, what it means that “we are not there yet” could be many things. The wording is vague, and there is not enough information. However, from leaks and rumors about the current state of negotiations, it appears that the nuclear program is now being actively discussed.

The Iranian Supreme Leader has ruled out exporting enriched uranium to a third-party state, which was originally part of Iran’s proposal and has since been removed from the table.

What that most likely means is that the U.S. is considering allowing some portion of that uranium, and possibly one or more nuclear sites, to remain, while discussing monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. How that would actually be enforced, beyond what Iran is willing to permit, remains unclear.

So far, the framework under discussion, since the U.S. and Iran re-engaged, has been very similar to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Obama-era agreement that was later withdrawn from by Trump during his first term. There may be differences, but if anything, this agreement will likely be narrower than the JCPOA.

I am not convinced that ballistic missile capabilities, largely beyond the practical reach of U.S. enforcement, will be part of the discussion at all. If the U.S. cannot realistically enforce dismantlement, it cannot effectively demand it. That is likely Iran’s calculation.

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The Strait of Hormuz is another likely source of disagreement. Recent public reporting suggests that Iran and Oman have been discussing joint tolling mechanisms that would effectively extract payments from the international community in exchange for guarantees of safe passage through the strait.

This stands in contrast to demands from the Trump administration to remove any form of blockade. If anything, it suggests that the U.S. may be conceding ground and accepting a version of the status quo. Iran, in turn, appears to be engaging other actors to share resources and revenue, thereby strengthening its maritime leverage.

This does not bode well for the future. Oman has traditionally been viewed as a U.S. ally. If such an ally openly aligns with Iran in undermining international maritime norms and extracting payments, it would imply tacit U.S. acceptance and potentially signal a broader shift. That, in turn, raises the possibility of a wider competition for maritime control globally.

There have also been recent reports that Iran has no plans to close the Strait of Hormuz. Meanwhile, the Houthi movement have reportedly discussed shutting down the Bab el-Mandeb in a similar fashion, potentially demanding payment for safe passage. Previously, their demands centered on political concessions; now it may be evolving into a revenue-generating strategy to offset wartime losses.

We are already seeing this discussion develop. There were discussions by Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore regarding the Strait of Malacca as a potential tolling mechanism. That idea has been discarded for the time being, and India has since strengthened its own position in the area. China would likely be the biggest loser in such a scenario.

Nevertheless, the issue remains: if Iran is allowed to extract financial concessions and exercise control over a stretch of international waters, why would other actors not attempt the same? China, for instance, could pursue a similar strategy in the South China Sea to pressure Taiwan.

That has been made more difficult by Japan and the Philippines strengthening their military positions, as well as close coordination between the United States and the Philippines. Still, we have seen Donald Trump’s reactions to Xi Jinping’s demands regarding blocking arms deals with Taiwan.

If freedom of navigation becomes negotiable, the United States may concede ground on other fronts. In other words, if this precedent holds, if the U.S. agrees to Iran’s demands and formalizes an arrangement that effectively turns the Strait of Hormuz into Iran’s domain, there is little to prevent similar actions elsewhere. The broader consequence would be a regression toward pre-modern maritime practices resembling privateering, rather than adherence to international maritime law.

Jacobsen: A smaller story, but I think it is relevant, especially given our previous work on the Unadorned book project and ongoing reporting. In addition to continued developments in Canada, though I have not yet seen this week’s full reporting, I expect we will see more of the same.

In London, there was an extremely explicit case aligning with broader findings from independent organizations documenting increases in antisemitism.

A man in London was arrested for shouting, “I will kill you Jews.” He also threatened to blow up Jewish schools an hour after being released from custody. He was jailed at Snaresbrook Crown Court on Friday after admitting to antisemitic hate crimes.

The individual, Tavius Jean Charles, 36 years old, made repeated threats to six victims between October 2025 and March 2026. These incidents occurred near synagogues in North London, an area described in the report as having a large Jewish community.

According to detectives, he was observed shouting death threats on March 16, 2026, but was arrested about a week later, not immediately. After being released, he was heard saying into his phone, “It would be good if we blew up one of their schools.”

This introduces an additional layer that was not heavily explored in the reporting. First, why the delay between the initial incident and arrest? Second, when he says, “we,” the obvious question is: who is “we”?

He pleaded guilty last month to seven racially aggravated public order offenses and one count of racially aggravated criminal damage, though details of the damage remain unclear.

This appears to fit into a broader pattern in London in recent months, including the stabbing of two Jewish men and multiple arson incidents.

To cross-reference slightly, in Canada, earlier in March, we saw three separate incidents involving gunfire directed at synagogues. So there is a pattern emerging: gunfire in Canada, arson in the United Kingdom, and increasingly explicit threats.

What are your thoughts?

Tsukerman: If I am being charitable, if this individual has accomplices, he may also have a hideout or some form of support network, which could have made him difficult to track. That could explain the delay in arrest.

However, it is also entirely possible that the delay reflects a lack of urgency or preparedness on the part of local police. That would not be unprecedented in London, given the recent series of incidents. In some cases, it has taken days or longer to arrest perpetrators involved in violent crimes, including those targeting the Jewish community, as well as after various riots and unrelated disturbances.

I do not think the police are well prepared for this level of escalation in violent threats targeting the Jewish community. Given the reported rise in antisemitic sentiment among the general public, with surveys suggesting that a significant portion of British citizens hold some form of antisemitic stereotype, it may be that there is insufficient public pressure to compel faster action.

If it is primarily the Jewish community and a limited number of political allies raising concern, law enforcement may prioritize other issues. Resource allocation is often shaped by political considerations, including how police are trained, deployed, and directed.

There is also growing concern that authorities may be hesitant to confront antisemitic threats aggressively out of fear of being accused of violating freedom of speech. This is occurring alongside criticism, particularly from some U.S. commentators and British nationals, that the UK is already too restrictive on speech in other contexts.

The problem is that there have been several violent attacks targeting the Jewish community in recent months, some reportedly linked to Iran-aligned actors following the escalation of hostilities. That creates a legitimate basis for concern, especially where identifiable groups have claimed responsibility.

In addition, there are non-state sympathizers who appear to be exploiting the situation to plan or carry out attacks with a perceived sense of impunity. In recent days, for example, there was a violent assault on a Hebrew-speaking young individual by a group of six Arabic-speaking men, resulting in injuries requiring medical treatment.

This points to a broader issue. The threats are becoming more immediate and more specific. There is a progression from general statements such as “I would like to kill Jews” to explicit proposals like “we should blow up synagogues.” That represents a clear escalation, from vague hostility to identifiable targets and methods.

It also raises the possibility that these are not isolated individuals making threats, but potential coordinated activity. Even in cases where threats are not acted upon, harassment and threats of violence are criminal offenses, not protected speech under democratic legal systems.

So the question is: has there been any investigation into his communications?

At this point, there may not be enough information to arrest him, but there is certainly enough to justify obtaining a warrant to monitor his communications and determine whether he is in fact planning a terrorist attack.

It is also possible that none of this is actionable, that he and others are simply fantasizing, without the skills, resources, or intent to carry anything out. It may ultimately come to nothing. Nevertheless, can that risk be taken after a pattern of escalating rhetoric, where someone is now suggesting possible planning and appears unconcerned about being overheard, in fact, possibly seeking attention?

Ignoring that would be extremely reckless. At a minimum, it warrants investigation. I do not think such measures would constitute a violation of rights, especially when weighed against the risk to potential targets, such as synagogues, if someone like this is not stopped in time.

The concern should not be framed as “he is just talking,” but rather that he has shown a repeated focus on specific targets and is now discussing them with a potential accomplice. That suggests a serious escalation.

To me, this reflects a reckless posture on the part of the police and authorities. While there have been arrests for antisemitic activity, there still appears to be a significant level of tolerance for it from city authorities in London.

There is a lack of focus, a lack of seriousness, and a lack of incentive. Quite frankly, with the exception of a few individuals in the current government, there seems to be a broader reluctance to confront specific threats.

Regarding Russia, as we have seen recently, the Keir Starmer government has authorized, following the U.S. example, a waiver on Russian oil due to high prices. Russian oligarchs have faced some pressure in the UK, but not nearly enough. Some still maintain property and influence.

There are also Islamist groups. There have been reports, including from Reuters, about Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps media and propaganda networks establishing a presence in London.

All of this points to a broadly non-confrontational posture when it comes to active security threats.

What categorizes antisemitic violence as a security threat? First, it is a direct threat to the safety of British citizens. Second, some of the actors involved are linked to state-aligned networks with clear political agendas.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 1,900 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.