Everywhere Insiders 47: Drone Warfare, Mali Instability, and Africa’s Emerging Security Crisis

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

In this interview, Scott Douglas Jacobsen speaks with Irina Tsukerman about escalating drone warfare in Sudan, the fragility of Mali’s pro-Russian junta, and broader instability across Africa. They examine how low-cost drone technology enables asymmetric warfare, weakening traditional military advantages. The discussion also covers regional proxy dynamics, humanitarian crises in Kenya, public health concerns, and xenophobic tensions in South Africa, highlighting systemic governance challenges and the global community’s limited capacity to respond effectively.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Drones are in Khartoum, which is one of my favorite names for cities in the entire world. It’s just a cool name—Khartoum. People, ministries, and agencies had started returning. Khartoum International Airport had been preparing to resume international flights, after years without regular international service. However, five people were killed in a civilian vehicle in Omdurman, according to Emergency Lawyers, a Sudanese rights group.

It was a drone strike as part of a barrage of assaults in the last few days—May 4 today. And this is obviously in Sudan, in the context of the war between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces, which began in April 2023. I mean, Sudan is a much larger topic, but we’ll sort of keep it focused. I don’t want to drag out everything about Sudan today.

Locals and activists attributed the Omdurman attack to the RSF. Neither the RSF nor the army immediately claimed that strike. Sudan’s information ministry said no one was injured and no damage was caused by the attack on Khartoum airport, which is different from the earlier killing in Omdurman.

Now, this is particularly acute because I’m in a war zone in month four, and the primary damage to civilian, medical, humanitarian, and media infrastructure, in addition to military targets, is from drones and ballistic missiles. For the aggressor state, as defined by various UN resolutions, damage to troops and personnel is also primarily due to drones.

As we discussed in some prior sessions, we’re seeing this in the Middle East and in Africa too. Once the technology starts to get distributed and becomes easier and cheaper, we start seeing a globalization of this problem. And you’ve commented on that as well, quite astutely.

So what is your take on this drone strike, disrupting months of relative calm in Khartoum? And then maybe we can talk about some other issues around this as well.

Irina Tsukerman: There are a couple of things going on. Well, first of all, the RSF and the Sudanese Armed Forces have been fighting a very bitter war since April 2023—over three years at this point. It seems that the army is in a stronger position in the capital. The RSF has so far failed to create a viable, legitimate form of government.

And they’ve also been losing ground territorially, including in Khartoum. It is, however, not surprising that they’re fighting for every inch and trying to surprise the army and whoever else with these attacks. It’s also not surprising that civilians will be affected. Both the RSF and the army have been accused of human rights abuses in the way they’ve used weapons and targeted civilian areas, whether indiscriminately or deliberately, for the sake of gaining an upper hand in the war.

Another thing that’s worth noting is that drones have become very easy not only to acquire but to manufacture. Increasingly, we will see drones being manufactured locally or moved through regional networks rather than simply exported in a conventional way. So whereas in the past you could accuse various states of funding and fueling the war, and to some extent that is still true.

Tsukerman: It is becoming increasingly easier for local forces to independently advance their agendas with very rudimentary tools. We have seen the effectiveness of relatively primitive drones in swarming and attacking areas and making advances against far more sophisticated and expensive countermeasures.

For instance, if the Sudanese government does not have access to effective counter-drone technologies and relies mostly on missiles and other drones to take them down, it will be at a significant disadvantage until it adapts. So do not be surprised if you see Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in talks with global counterparts, including but not limited to Ukraine, to explore acquiring counter-drone technologies or bringing in experts to assist.

Because if anything, the RSF seems to have gained a second wind here, and there may be more surprises in store if they have figured out how to wage asymmetrical warfare effectively with these drones. If they have also determined that the government, like many others, has not adapted appropriately to these types of drone swarms, they may exploit that advantage in the coming days.

They may also be relying on the fact that much of the global attention is focused elsewhere. However, claims of simultaneous large-scale Iranian attacks on the UAE should be treated cautiously; regional tensions involving Iran and United Arab Emirates persist, but not all reported escalations are confirmed in real time. The broader point remains: Sudan risks being deprioritized in global attention cycles.

We have also seen that while there has been global attention on what is happening in Mali, there has not been any serious effort to intervene decisively between competing armed actors, including a military junta with ties to Russia and Islamist militant groups linked to al-Qaeda. So in this case, while much of the international community may prefer to see the Sudanese government stabilize the situation and end the war, it is not viewed as a clearly legitimate or heroic faction either. That reduces incentives for meaningful intervention between two problematic actors.

The other issue is that, despite the likelihood that the RSF has begun manufacturing or assembling drones locally and adapting tactics based on lessons from other conflicts, there is also a proxy dimension at play. In other words, the timing may not be entirely coincidental relative to broader regional dynamics.

The United Arab Emirates has been widely reported as a political backer of the RSF, although definitive public evidence of direct large-scale military support remains contested. Its alignment is partly due to concerns that the Sudanese Armed Forces have Islamist elements, and partly due to strategic interests—military access, gold resources, and trade routes—that Khartoum has historically resisted granting.

At the same time, Saudi Arabia and Egypt have aligned more closely with the Sudanese government. These overlapping rivalries suggest that what appears to be a domestic conflict is also shaped by regional competition.

So this conflict, which has been ongoing without resolution, may yet see renewed intensity depending on how these external alignments evolve and how effectively each side adapts technologically.

There may be more active involvement by the UAE in some way, at least in terms of political backing for this faction, if they feel continuing pressure from the other actors and feel targeted.

For instance, right now, with Iran-UAE tensions and other GCC members formally backing the UAE against Iran, the actors are still fighting against each other with respect to their own regional interests. And with the Khartoum government allegedly employing Iranian drones in at least some previous operations, this may also be a public gesture against Iran, not just against the other countries that are backing Khartoum.

There is this perception. The UAE has, in the past, accused those other countries of collaborating with Iran to arm Khartoum. They were not exactly wrong, because it has happened before. The latest news is that, supposedly, in light of these developments and because Saudi Arabia has also faced Iranian pressure, the Khartoum government has backed away from any such collaborations. But, of course, optics are everything, and this perception still holds strongly with pro-UAE elements in public, both in Africa and the Middle East and elsewhere.

Jacobsen: Following from last week’s commentaries, Mali’s defense minister, General Sadio Camara, was killed and has been replaced by Mali’s leader, Assimi Goïta. So now the statements are that the defense minister was killed by al-Qaeda-linked militants and Tuareg separatists.

Mali’s former army chief of staff, General Oumar Diarra, will serve as deputy defense minister. The decision was described in one report as “a strategic decision coming in a security context that remains sensitive.” That is a very amorphous euphemism for “our defense minister was murdered.” A suspected hantavirus outbreak has occurred on a cruise ship off Cabo Verde.

Kenya has significant death tolls from floods and landslides. And an interesting case: I have not been paying enough attention to this one, but around 130 Nigerians are seeking repatriation from South Africa after protests, according to Abuja sources. They have asked to be flown home following protests targeting foreigners. This is according to Nigerian Foreign Minister Bianca Odumegwu-Ojukwu.

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It is a series of things moving here: protests making people move and want to be repatriated, environmental disasters, and very standard international euphemisms from governments in “sensitive contexts.” So what are your thoughts on some of the issues happening after this week?

Tsukerman: So regarding the Mali story, essentially, it is very interesting because the latest development is that ISIS-linked media have mocked the alliance between the Tuareg separatists and JNIM against the pro-Russian junta. This is really a nexus of horrible actors, where I think most of us would basically say, “A plague on both their houses, and may they all lose.”

The Tuareg are somewhat of an exception, but Tuareg groups have also, in the past, received political backing and possible training from external actors, including Turkey, which has pursued its own interests across Africa. Much of Turkey’s attention has been on Somalia and North Africa until fairly recently, but it has been expanding further into other parts of the continent.

And the Tuareg have not been restricted to Mali. They have operated in North Africa and across the Sahel. These are tribal and separatist groups that have, at times, aligned informally or tactically with other groups, including JNIM, the al-Qaeda-linked coalition.

In this case, they have felt disenfranchised from Malian politics for a very long time, including under the previous French-backed government. Part of the reason the previous government fell as easily as it did was precisely because these various constituencies felt they were not part of the decision-making or military integration process.

None of that has been resolved under the pro-Russian junta. The agreements with Tuareg groups have not been adequately addressed. Essentially, while some groups may have felt they would be better served by the Russians than by the French, and may have felt temporary relief that the French post-colonial presence was finally out of the country, it does not seem as though the junta has done any better on security than its predecessors. In fact, it is obviously much worse.

So we are seeing that JNIM and allied armed groups have been taking advantage of Russia’s distractions elsewhere, including failures in Ukraine and other geopolitical crises, and have moved very aggressively and rapidly. They caught everyone except those who have been closely watching this by surprise.

What I am saying is that this is not a new issue. The Tuareg-JNIM alignment has been gaining ground for some time, and they have been pressuring the Malian junta for some time. There have been internal talks within the African Union, ECOWAS-adjacent circles, and other regional forums about providing assistance against the insurgencies. There have also been debates over whether the juntas would accept that external assistance, given that they have been close to open confrontation with some other African states.

So the political and security landscape has been complicated enough, with enough of this happening over time, that no one should be surprised—except by the fact that, after clear evidence that these groups have been gaining leverage, and that the pro-Russian junta has not been able to come up with a clear strategy to push them back decisively, many locals in Mali still have not figured out that the junta is quite a bit more vulnerable and fragile than it led itself to believe.

Essentially, a lot of people in Mali fell for false advertising from Russia. That should be the only real surprise about this current predicament.

What is going to happen next? Much will depend on whether Mali agrees to international assistance and whether anyone is currently in a position to provide that assistance, given the multitude of other conflicts that are in some kind of hot stage around the world—from Sudan to the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the continuing war in Ukraine, and the possibility of future pressure on the Baltic states, as well as other smaller conflicts in Africa.

The same countries that would have been available to provide more decisive assistance a year ago may no longer be in that position. We are seeing critical shortages of ammunition and missile interceptors around the world. Clearly, the international community’s attention, briefly captured by the Mali predicament, is also focused on other areas, because that particular area seems to have been lost to European or Western influence for the time being.

What happens if the junta actually falls to the JNIM-Tuareg alliance? Well, you can expect a fight for power between those two groups to determine whether any coalition is possible. I suspect JNIM will not be very open to power sharing, and you may see a chaotic environment spilling over into neighbouring countries if this happens, with some pro-junta and other elements being drawn into the conflict to push their own interests.

If, in fact, any sort of coalition—or simply a JNIM takeover—occurs, we may see the first al-Qaeda-led state in the world. I doubt it would get much international recognition, but, on the other hand, they are clearly emulating the Taliban in their approach, with the same issues replicating themselves in Mali.

Mali is already among the poorest countries in the world. Continuing conflict will certainly hit civilians the hardest and will likely draw more young people into various militant configurations—some with ideological leanings, and some simply because of economic necessity, pressure, and hopelessness.

I do not think there is a purely military solution to this conflict unless some country decides to enter with overwhelming force, or some international coalition decides to do that. I do not think anyone is particularly interested in that right now, least of all the French. I think they will let this fight between the sides play itself out, and then they will make decisions based on what happens.

If we do end up with an al-Qaeda-led government, that will certainly strengthen other al-Qaeda-linked groups around the world and probably bring even more terrorists.

By the way, side note on the Mali thing: it was not just the defense minister who was killed in action. Apparently, the head of intelligence and some other senior officials disappeared. I do not know if the deaths were confirmed yet, but they were certainly missing in action, and that is actually a huge hit. They were already not in great shape, given that the intelligence services failed to foresee this unsurprising development. With senior intelligence and Defense Ministry figures gone, the disarray may continue, and it may only be a matter of time before the fighting resumes with even more leverage for the alliance of insurgents.

Now, regarding Kenya: unfortunately, while Kenya’s economy is one of the more vigorous ones in Africa, that still does not provide a perfect solution to weather- and climate-related tragedies, or to poor and underdeveloped infrastructure in some parts of the country. We are seeing that play out now with deadly impact from floods and landslides, some of it possibly preventable.

I hope this horrific and tragic incident advances cooperation with other members of the international community, both in and outside Africa, and brings more best practices for guarding against such events in Kenya, preventing further infrastructural and human damage from foreseeable climatic disasters.

Unfortunately, things like that happen. They are not 100 percent under anyone’s control. But what can be done is to strengthen infrastructure, create better mechanisms for relocating people to safety before and during disasters, and improve communications so that the government can operate more efficiently and reach people before they are cut off or killed. That is something that can be done, and hopefully things will improve with time, and we will hear about fewer such incidents.

Now, the hantavirus outbreak is fascinating for all the wrong reasons. This is the first time such a deadly occurrence has been heard of in recent years, at least with the fear of norovirus—basically stomach flu—becoming quite common in crowded, isolated environments such as cruise ships. But hantavirus is deadly.

We have not heard of something like this before in that context. In fact, only recently have we heard about the development of deadly hantaviruses and concerns about their possible spread, including what may happen if they move beyond expected settings. Unfortunately, in this particular case, three people died as a result of the outbreak on a ship.

A fairly large number of people remain confined, and some may still be at risk of infection. The WHO says the public-health risk is low, but it also said similar things early in the COVID outbreak. Quite frankly, the WHO’s response to COVID was subpar, and that is part of the reason the United States ultimately withdrew, arguing that the organization was too deferential to China. China had every reason in the world to cover its own tracks.

Even at the cost of human life and cooperation with the international community on tracking COVID. So far, I do not think there is evidence that this hantavirus outbreak is anywhere near as spreadable, infectious, or globally deadly as COVID had been. But the fact that the WHO is making very early pronouncements, without necessarily explaining how something like this happened in the first place, means a lot of people will be skeptical of its prognosis, even if it happens to be accurate in this particular instance.

This also addresses the fact that cruise ships are not the safest environment. Any place that is extremely crowded, where people are confined for a period of time, creates conditions where infection can spread. Once it occurs, it can spread easily, as with noroviruses. Obviously, if there is a more deadly illness that breaks out, the consequences can be far deadlier.

Would I necessarily advise people not to take cruises because of this one incident? Probably not. But I would certainly hope that the companies behind these cruise lines take the repetition of outbreaks into consideration. Maybe less is more sometimes. Maybe having fewer passengers, even if it means higher costs or a little less profit, will keep people safer, and fewer people will have their vacations ruined by illness.

Now, regarding the incident with the repatriation of Nigerians, there has been an ongoing debacle over xenophobic outcries in South Africa against Nigerians and other foreign nationals. That has included anti-immigrant rhetoric, protests, harassment, and allegations of violence.

That has led to protests, and I am sure that this particular episode is not the only reason people are seeking to return. It is probably because, alongside discriminatory statements, they have likely experienced discriminatory treatment in jobs, in everyday life on the streets, and institutionally.

There are clearly unresolved issues in South Africa regarding people from other countries. Frankly, that is not isolated to South Africa. A number of African countries have seen conflicts involving foreign nationals from other African states. To claim that racial, ethnic, or intercultural tensions are unique to the Western world is a gross and ignorant underestimation of other cultures. Bias toward one’s own culture is prevalent everywhere and should not surprise anyone.

Unfortunately, some countries are better at handling it than others, and in South Africa, this has clearly not been handled very well.

One of the noteworthy episodes involved the deaths of two Nigerians, allegedly after encounters with security officials. That is an institutional failure. This is not just street bigotry or low-level conspiratorial thinking by private citizens. This is an institutional failure. And this is probably, unfortunately, the most noteworthy recent episode by virtue of its lethality, but not the first or last of its type.

There have also been outcries by Ghanaians and other African citizens after a series of xenophobic attacks, accusations, and widespread reports of violence and discrimination against foreign nationals. So clearly, this is an issue in South Africa. While many people have correctly praised the end of apartheid and the progress South Africa has made since then, not all of those issues have been resolved.

And while tensions between Black and White populations may have been managed more effectively over time, these other tensions with neighbouring countries and foreign nationals clearly have not been dealt with with the same level of attention or interest, unfortunately.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 1,800 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.