Everywhere Insiders 48: Iran, Russia, Taiwan, Organized Crime, and Global Security

Irina Tsukerman is a human rights and national security attorney based in New York and Connecticut. She earned her Bachelor of Arts in National and Intercultural Studies and Middle East Studies from Fordham University in 2006, followed by a Juris Doctor from Fordham University School of Law in 2009. She operates a boutique national security law practice. She serves as President of Scarab Rising, Inc., a media and security strategic advisory firm. Additionally, she is the Editor-in-Chief of The Washington Outsider, which focuses on foreign policy, geopolitics, security, and human rights. She is actively involved in several professional organizations, including the American Bar Association’s Energy, Environment, and Science and Technology Sections, where she serves as Program Vice Chair in the Oil and Gas Committee. She is also a member of the New York City Bar Association. She serves on the Middle East and North Africa Affairs Committee and affiliates with the Foreign and Comparative Law Committee.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen and Irina Tsukerman discuss escalating geopolitical tensions across the Middle East, Latin America, Ukraine, and China. Tsukerman analyzes Iran’s missile and nuclear posture, Russia’s strategic support for Tehran, Taiwan’s opportunities in Latin America, organized crime as a hemispheric security issue, skepticism around Russia-Ukraine ceasefires, and China’s governance failures. The interview links immediate crises to deeper institutional, ideological, and strategic structures shaping global instability.

Scott Douglas Jacobsen: Let’s examine the Middle East today. There is a great deal happening.

The United Arab Emirates has announced its exit from OPEC and OPEC+, effective May 1, 2026. The move is expected to weaken OPEC’s control over global oil supplies.

This comes amid stalled negotiations involving the United States and Iran. The UAE has also faced Iranian-linked missile and drone threats against civilian and energy infrastructure, including attacks affecting water and energy systems.

Iran’s economy and regional position remain under strain from sanctions and internal pressures. Meanwhile, Russian President Vladimir Putin met Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in St. Petersburg in April 2026, as Moscow and Tehran continued to emphasize their strategic partnership. Any commentary on that general thrust so far?

Irina Tsukerman: The broader significance lies in Russia’s assistance to Iran. Reports indicate that Russia has provided, or plans to provide, Iran with intelligence and technical support relevant to U.S. military assets and other sites in the Middle East.

At the same time, the UAE has been an important destination for Russian capital, business activity, and sanctions circumvention. This makes Moscow’s posture notable: Russia appears to be prioritizing its military and security relationship with Iran over its economic ties with the UAE.

The signal from Russia and Iran is clear. Moscow has not meaningfully restrained Tehran’s pressure campaign against Gulf states. In strategic terms, Russia may benefit from pressure on the UAE and the United States, particularly if it complicates Gulf security cooperation with Israel and the West.

Another factor is the Abraham Accords. Since normalization, Israel’s security and intelligence relationships with some Gulf states have expanded. Disrupting those links would serve Iranian interests and may indirectly benefit Russia’s regional ambitions.

Russia is also trying to preserve and expand its influence in the Middle East after losing ground in Syria. The Gulf remains strategically attractive to Moscow for historical, military, and energy reasons.

Israel is also a competitor to Russia in certain areas, including defense exports, technology, and regional influence. Although Israel is a smaller market, it is more advanced in business innovation and technological integration, while Russia continues to face significant economic and currency pressures.

There is an element of competition here that Israeli leadership may not fully recognize, but the Emiratis should. Russia has found its relationship with the UAE useful for advancing its own agenda, but not sufficiently valuable to constrain Iranian-aligned threats against Emirati civilians. The UAE should be reassessing Russia’s role in its foreign relations, just as it has reconsidered aspects of its relationship with Iran.

Jacobsen: The framing itself is telling. Coverage is increasingly organized around an “Iran war” lens rather than a broader Middle East context.

An Iranian museum has hosted a rare exhibit of American art as a reflection on the current conflict. The choice is subtle but notable: the focus is on American art, not Israeli art, despite the fact that tensions often involve both the United States and Israel. Cultural signaling like this has precedent. Even critics of Israel, such as Noam Chomsky, have opposed broad cultural boycotts on the grounds that they target intellectual and artistic life rather than state policy.

Israel has indicted a Jewish Israeli man accused of attacking a Christian nun in Jerusalem. If the charges are substantiated, the legal response is consistent with enforcement of domestic law across religious lines.

At the same time, human-interest stories continue to emerge from the region. Reports describe Palestinian children finding respite through activities such as breakdancing, an example of cultural coping mechanisms amid conflict.

Markets have reacted predictably. Wall Street has fallen from record highs, and oil prices have risen following renewed fighting in the Middle East.

Politically, tensions remain unresolved. Donald Trump has expressed dissatisfaction with proposals involving Iran. Meanwhile, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has reiterated commitments to maintaining the country’s nuclear and missile capabilities.

Tsukerman: From a strategic perspective, missile capabilities represent an immediate and tangible threat, given Iran’s existing arsenal. The nuclear issue is more complex. Iran maintains that its program is defensive and sovereign, yet concerns persist internationally due to its past rhetoric, regional posture, and the potential implications of weaponization.

A further complication is Iran’s demonstrated pattern of asymmetric response. Rather than limiting retaliation to direct military targets, its strategy has at times involved broader regional pressure through proxies or indirect means. This expands the implications of any escalation, particularly in the context of nuclear capability.

At present, there is no clear pathway to full demilitarization of Iran while maintaining the current regime structure. The situation remains a strategic impasse, with risks distributed across conventional, missile, and potential nuclear domains.

It should not be treated differently from the postwar restructuring of Germany after World War II or the demilitarization of Japan. The argument is that anything short of structural transformation risks future instability. The reasoning is that the current Iranian system is deeply institutionalized, with large numbers of committed supporters embedded in security, political, and paramilitary structures. Estimates vary, but organizations such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and affiliated networks command significant manpower and influence.

At the same time, there are many citizens who are dissatisfied with the regime but are not in a position to take major personal risks. This dynamic is not unique. In both Germany and Japan, large portions of the population were not uniformly committed to the dominant ideology, yet the systems themselves were sufficiently entrenched to require external restructuring.

There is a recurring argument that Iran is highly nationalistic and that foreign intervention would unify the population against outside actors. That risk exists. However, the counterargument is that if the regime remains in place in its current form, it will continue to mobilize nationalism in opposition to external actors such as the United States and regional rivals.

Jacobsen: Is it reasonable for Iran to maintain some level of self-defense?

Tsukerman: In principle, every sovereign state maintains defensive capabilities. The issue is not the existence of defense structures but their orientation and use. There is no clear, unified coalition preparing to invade Iran. Most regional and global actors have focused on deterrence rather than offensive action, even amid decades of tensions, proxy conflicts, and sanctions.

From that perspective, large-scale offensive or expansionist military preparation is difficult to justify as purely defensive. At the same time, Iran’s strategic doctrine emphasizes deterrence through missiles, proxies, and asymmetric capabilities rather than conventional invasion forces.

Iran’s geopolitical environment is also complex. Its relationships with China and Russia are pragmatic rather than fully aligned. China is a dominant economic partner with significant influence over Iranian energy exports, while Russia has cooperated with Iran in certain theaters but also competed for influence. Relations with Iraq have improved since 2003, although they remain shaped by historical tensions and differing internal dynamics.

Internally, Iran faces significant challenges tied to governance, identity, and dissent. Nationalism is not only directed outward but has also been a source of internal pressure on minority groups and dissenting populations.

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A central concern is ideological posture. Iranian leadership has long refused to recognize Israel as a legitimate state, framing it instead as an illegitimate political entity. This position is reflected in official rhetoric, education, and state media, although public opinion within Iran is more diverse than official narratives suggest.

The broader issue is whether these ideological and strategic positions remain contained or are projected outward through regional networks, media influence, and aligned organizations. That externalization of internal doctrine is a key factor shaping regional instability.

And the state itself does not accept Israel’s legitimacy. We see the consequences of that posture. Those consequences are not confined to Iran; they extend outward, including into cultural and political spaces internationally. For example, campaigns to boycott Israeli cultural or academic institutions have appeared in various countries, including in the West. That reflects, in part, the diffusion of ideological positions beyond the region.

For those who believe that de-escalation of the current military conflict would resolve underlying tensions, that view is incomplete. Iran’s regional posture has been developing over decades, not just in the present moment. Elements of ideology, education, and state policy have, at times, framed conflict as something instrumental rather than something to be resolved through political or humanitarian means.

This is part of why the situation is difficult to manage or contain. It is not simply a matter of reducing immediate hostilities; the underlying structures and incentives remain in place. The result is a complex and persistent strategic problem.

Jacobsen: Let’s shift regions. In Latin America, there are a few notable developments. Paraguay and Taiwan have reaffirmed diplomatic ties, even as China continues efforts to persuade Taipei’s remaining allies to switch recognition. This challenges the assumption that China’s diplomatic expansion is linear or inevitable.

Laura Fernández has been sworn in as president of Costa Rica. Meanwhile, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil has been engaged in discussions concerning organized crime and trade tensions, including tariffs associated with Donald Trump.

The Trump administration has also outlined a counterterrorism strategy that places greater emphasis on organized crime groups in the Western Hemisphere, particularly cartels. In principle, prioritizing cartel violence is not unreasonable; the key issue will be how such a strategy is implemented. Historically, this has not always been at the forefront of U.S. national security policy, so a shift in emphasis could open space for more coordinated government-to-government responses to threats affecting civilians.

Tsukerman: There are several factors behind a somewhat strengthened position for Taiwan in Latin America. One is the political shift in some countries toward more conservative or pro-Western leadership. Another is the effort by the United States to limit China’s influence in the region. Even without explicitly promoting Taiwan, constraining China’s financial and diplomatic reach can indirectly benefit Taipei’s position.

A third factor is emerging triangulation involving Latin American countries and Israel. Some states are expanding diplomatic and technological engagement with Israel, while Taiwan has also increased its outreach, including high-level visits that have drawn criticism from China. These dynamics are interconnected, though they do not directly alter the strategic situation involving Iran.

Israel has expanded its outreach in Latin America, though not through anything formally known as “ISIL Accords.” Rather, it has strengthened bilateral agreements and diplomatic ties with countries such as Argentina and others in the region. These efforts resemble, in a limited sense, the spirit of the Abraham Accords, focusing on normalization, security cooperation, trade, and cultural exchange, though they are not part of a single unified framework.

In Latin America, these relationships may have greater room to develop at the societal level. Many of these countries are democratic, with relatively open civil societies, allowing for more organic people-to-people engagement alongside formal diplomacy.

Taken together, several factors create an opening for Taiwan to expand its diplomatic reach in the region. However, Taiwan remains constrained by its size and by the enduring economic and cultural influence of China, which continues to shape regional alignments. Latin America is only one part of Taiwan’s broader strategic priorities.

Jacobsen: Regarding Costa Rica, the transition to new leadership appears structured toward continuity. Laura Fernández has assumed the presidency, and early indications suggest a continuation of existing policy directions. There are also efforts to strengthen coordination between the executive branch and the Legislative Assembly.

The transition model is somewhat unusual in that the previous leadership appears to retain an informal or advisory presence. This could facilitate institutional continuity, though it may also generate political friction depending on how influence is exercised. Overall, Costa Rica is expected to remain a relatively stable, pro-Western partner of the United States, with a trajectory toward continued regional engagement.

Tsukerman: Turning to Brazil, the dynamic involving Donald Trump and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is noteworthy. Their political orientations and past interactions have been markedly different, particularly in the context of Brazil’s internal political crises involving Jair Bolsonaro. The January 8, 2023 events in Brazil, in which government institutions were attacked, drew comparisons to the January 6, 2021 events in the United States.

Lula’s record is also complex. He was previously convicted on corruption charges, though those convictions were later annulled by Brazil’s Supreme Court, allowing his return to political office. In his current term, Lula has sought to expand Brazil’s global role, including engagement with BRICS partners and cooperation with countries such as India on emerging technologies.

Brazil has also shown interest in strengthening its defense industry and international economic position. Trade tensions, including tariff disputes associated with Trump-era policies, remain a point of contention. Legal challenges to certain tariff measures have arisen in U.S. courts, adding another layer of complexity to bilateral economic relations.

Overall, tariffs and organized crime are likely to remain central issues in any high-level discussions, reflecting both domestic priorities and broader geopolitical competition in the Western Hemisphere.

There is also an active group of members of the U.S. Congress who oppose Donald Trump’s use of tariffs as a largely unilateral policy tool. Their argument is that tariffs function as taxes and raise constitutional concerns about the balance of authority between Congress and the executive branch. Despite this opposition, Trump has continued to advocate for, and in some cases threaten, additional tariffs against various countries.

A recent example is his warning that the European Union could face further tariffs if a trade agreement is not reached within a specified timeframe. It is likely that trade policy will be a major topic in discussions with Latin American leaders, as tariffs are central to Trump’s economic worldview and negotiating strategy.

Organized crime is another major priority. In the Western Hemisphere, it is both a national security issue and a focus of evolving counterterrorism frameworks. There are documented links between certain transnational criminal organizations and groups that engage in terrorist tactics, including violence against civilians and state institutions.

The United States has been attempting to strengthen cooperation with Latin American governments to address these threats. Incidents involving large-scale confrontations between law enforcement and cartels, sometimes disrupting civilian life and even affecting foreign nationals, highlight the scale of the problem. In Brazil and elsewhere, organized crime has been a persistent, decades-long challenge.

Whether deeper cooperation between the United States and regional governments will meaningfully improve outcomes remains uncertain. However, it is unsurprising that this issue is high on the agenda for leaders on both sides.

Regarding the evolving counterterrorism strategy, one notable development is the increasing tendency to treat certain cartel activities as comparable to terrorism. While there is overlap, particularly where cartels use tactics such as mass violence, intimidation, and control over territory, there is also a conceptual risk. Expanding the definition of terrorism too broadly could dilute its meaning and potentially divert resources away from addressing politically motivated violence at the international level.

At the same time, the scale of organized crime justifies serious attention. In some countries, criminal networks have penetrated state institutions, influencing governance, law enforcement, and even judicial systems. Elements of this influence have also reached into the United States and other regions.

There is, therefore, a strategic logic in elevating organized crime within national security frameworks. However, it remains a distinct category of threat, and treating it as identical to terrorism carries both analytical and policy risks.

This issue has a profound impact on national trajectories, and there is no simple answer. Organized crime is a growing problem, intensified by corruption and populist politics across parts of Latin America. It cannot be addressed through unilateral action by the United States alone. What is required is a long-term, integrated approach that includes strengthening institutions, reducing corruption, and addressing internal political dynamics within affected countries. Leadership changes, whether involving figures like Donald Trump, Boris Yeltsin, or Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, do not, by themselves, resolve structural problems. The broader trajectory remains uncertain.

Jacobsen: Turning to another development: as of May 8, Trump has claimed that Russia and Ukraine agreed to a three-day ceasefire, along with a prisoner exchange. Public reaction, however, has been skeptical, given the length of the war and repeated failures to sustain previous ceasefires.

The proposal reportedly involves a suspension of kinetic military activity, which could still leave room for cyber operations and other non-kinetic actions. The suggested exchange of up to 1,000 prisoners would be substantial. At the same time, there is concern that expectations may be set unrealistically high, allowing more limited outcomes to be framed as successes. What are your thoughts?

Tsukerman: Prisoner exchanges do have humanitarian value, particularly in alleviating suffering for detainees and their families. However, I would be cautious about placing too much confidence in ceasefire commitments from Russia, given past patterns.

There is also a question of timing and motivation. Russia has faced various pressures, including operational and symbolic ones. For example, security concerns have affected the scale and presentation of events such as the annual Victory Day Parade in Moscow, which historically serves as a major display of military strength and political messaging.

From Ukraine’s perspective, maintaining pressure, militarily and psychologically, has strategic value. Continued operations, including strikes on military and logistical targets, can shape both battlefield dynamics and public perception.

In that context, any external intervention framed as stabilizing the situation may also be interpreted as indirectly relieving pressure on Russia. Whether such efforts ultimately contribute to de-escalation or simply reset the tactical environment remains an open question.

Preventing complete embarrassment for Russia, particularly around symbolic events, can, in my view, undercut the value of sustained tactical pressure. I do not expect any ceasefire to hold. At some point, it is likely to be violated. Even a short pause can give Russia space to regroup, reinforce its messaging, and reposition itself as less politically weakened than it might otherwise appear.

There are already reports of violations of earlier ceasefire efforts, including those announced around religious holidays such as Easter. That pattern reinforces skepticism about the durability of any new agreement.

Jacobsen: On a different note, recent U.S. labor data shows that employers added approximately 115,000 jobs in April. That is a positive signal, though perhaps modest in scale. There are also two troubling international stories: a deadly explosion at a fireworks facility in China, with dozens reported killed, and the case of an imprisoned Chinese journalist whose family is appealing for release due to serious health concerns. Any thoughts to conclude?

Tsukerman: Job growth is always a positive development, particularly for those directly affected. However, it does not eliminate broader structural risks. Issues such as supply chain disruptions, inflationary pressures, and potential shortages, whether in energy, food, or industrial inputs, can still lead to job losses in other sectors, including agriculture and manufacturing. So while gains in one area are worth acknowledging, they should be viewed within a wider economic context.

Regarding the explosion in China, such tragedies are deeply concerning. In a country of China’s scale, industrial accidents do occur, but their frequency often raises questions about safety enforcement, regulatory oversight, and local governance. The priority should be stronger safety standards, better infrastructure management, and more effective emergency response systems to prevent similar incidents.

As for the imprisoned journalist, the family’s appeal on humanitarian grounds is telling. Arguments based on press freedom or free expression are unlikely to succeed with the Chinese Communist Party, which does not recognize those principles in the same way liberal democracies do. A humanitarian appeal, focused on health and compassion, may be seen as more pragmatic.

At the same time, cases like this highlight broader systemic issues. Mechanisms of control in China, including surveillance and social governance systems, reflect a top-down model in which public accountability operates differently from democratic systems. Appeals framed around international image or humanitarian concern may have some influence, particularly if authorities see reputational value in responding.

Ultimately, these situations underscore a recurring theme: whether in conflict zones, economic systems, or governance structures, short-term developments often sit atop deeper, unresolved structural challenges.

Jacobsen: Thank you very much for the opportunity and your time, Irina.

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Scott Douglas Jacobsen is a Writer-Editor for The Good Men Project with more than 1,900 publications on the platform. He is the Founder and Publisher of In-Sight Publishing (ISBN: 978-1-0692343; 978-1-0673505) and Editor-in-Chief of In-Sight: Interviews (ISSN: 2369-6885). He writes for International Policy Digest (ISSN: 2332–9416), The Humanist (Print: ISSN, 0018-7399; Online: ISSN, 2163-3576), Basic Income Earth Network (UK Registered Charity 1177066), Humanist Perspectives (ISSN: 1719-6337), A Further Inquiry (SubStack), Vocal, Medium, The New Enlightenment Project, The Washington Outsider, rabble.ca, and other media. His bibliography index can be found via the Jacobsen Bank at In-Sight Publishing comprised of more than 10,000 articles, interviews, and republications, in more than 200 outlets. He has served in national and international leadership roles within humanist and media organizations, held several academic fellowships, and currently serves on several boards. He is a member in good standing in numerous media organizations, including the Canadian Association of Journalists, PEN Canada (CRA: 88916 2541 RR0001), and Reporters Without Borders (SIREN: 343 684 221/SIRET: 343 684 221 00041/EIN: 20-0708028), and others.